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ABSTRACT 
In this present work, I attempt to present the peculiar way of nation-building in the 
Republic of Kazakstan since its independence in December 1991 and its reflection in 
the main trends of the republic's foreign policy. While doing this, I also emphasize the 
republic's historical background, especially its long-lasting suffering from Tsarist 
colonial rule, which later was replaced by more severe Soviet rule. I dwell on the past 
and current demographic situation in the republic, which beyond doubt plays one of the 
most important roles in the formation and commitment of the republic's policy. In my 
thesis, I evaluate the reasons and circumstances that force the re_pu~ljc_~9_ ~9~!-~ 
'concessive' policy towards Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
-------- - -~ 
countries. Besides historical and political peculiarities, I also consider the economic 
aspects af the republic's foreign policy, which to a great extent is based on exploring 
practical ways of exporting Caspian oil and gas. 
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OZET 
i~bu tezde Kazakistan Cumhuriyetinin 1991 Arahk aymda kazand1g1 bag1ms1zhktan 
beri stirdtirdtigu milli yap1lanma siyasetinin bu tilkeye has ozellekler ve o siyasetinin 
tilkenin temel dt~ politika yoneli~indeki yans1malan tizerinde durulmaktadtr. Konunun 
anlat1m1 sirasmda tilkenin tarihsel geymi~i, ve ozellikle Kazak halkmm astrlar boyunca 
magruz kald1g1 somtirgeci Carhk donemi ve daha sonra onun yerini alacak olan ve 
~tiphesiz daha da zalim olan Sovyet doneminin btrakt1g1 izleri ele ahnmaktadtr. 
Kazakistan'm tarihi "miras1" olan ve emsali kolay bulunamayacak olan demografik 
dengesizlik gilntimtiziln Kazak dt~ politikism1 yonlendiren en temel etkenlerden 
birisidir. 
Bu tezimde tizerinde durulan konulardan biri de Kazakistan't Rusya Federasyonu'na 
ve diger BDT devletlerine kar~t "tavizci" taraf olmaya zorlayan sebepler ve durumlar ve 
onlarm degerlendirilmesidir. Kazakistan'm tarihsel ve siyasi ozellikler dt~mda tilkenin 
dt~ politikasmm altmda yatan iktisadi ili~kiler ve t>zellikle bu tilke i<tin en hayati 
meselelerden biri olan Hazar Deniz petrollerinin tiretimi ve dtinya piyasasma nakli 
konulan da ele almm1~ttr. 
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Introduction 
In the early months after achieving independence in December 1991 the situation in 
the Republic of Kazakstan could easily be compared to a state devastated by war: the 
republic had no military establishment, national bank and currency, embassies abroad, 
international contacts, and, what is most important, it had no experience in independent 
state-building and policy-making. There was no coordination between the sectors of its 
own economy: while former Union-wide economic links had already collapsed, the 
republic's economic transactions became completely paralyzed. 
The Russian domination of the Kazaks began in 1726, when Abulhayr Khan of the 
Ki~i Jiiz (Small Horde) Kazaks requested Russian protection upon the severe invasion 
of Jungars, nomadic tribes from the Mongol stock, from the East; later in 1740, the 
same appeal was made by the khans of Orta Jiiz (Middle Horde), Ablay and 
Abulmambet. 1 The Russian domination over the Kazak lands was followed by a severe 
policy of colonization of the native population bolstered by immigration of the Slavs 
and administrative division into gubemiyas and oblasts, which did not correspond to the 
delineation of the traditional grazing areas of Kazaks. According to the all-Russian 
census of 1897, the Kazak (Kirghiz)2 steppes was inhabited by 4,147,800 people, 
3,392,000 of whom (or 81.7%) were Kazaks; by 1914, the total population reached 
5,910,000, where Kazaks amounted to 3,845,200 (65.1 % ).3 
In the Russian period of Kazak history, several bitter uprisings occurred in the 
Kazak steppe when the Kazaks stood up against Russian troops and administration. The 
Kazaks, especially those of the Small Horde, were involved in the revolt of Yemelyan 
1 N.A. Khalfin, Rossia i khanstva Sredney Azii, Moscow, 1974, p. 13. 
2 Early Russian travellers confused the Kazakhs with the Kirghiz and until the mid-1920 the Kazaks were 
known as Kirghz-Kaisak or simply as Kirghiz while the modem Kirghiz were known as Kara-Kirghiz. 
3 A.K. Akishev et al.( eds.), lstoriya Kazakhstana s drevneyshih vremen do nashih dney, Almaty, 1993 
(hereafter Istoriya Kazakhstana), p. 260. 
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Pugachev ( 1773-1774 ), the greatest and most violent peasant revolt in Tsarist history. 4 
From 1837 and until 1846, Kenesar1 Qas1mov, the khan of Orta Jiiz (the Middle Horde) 
and the grandson of Ablay Khan, the last Sultan of the three Kazak Hordes, led the 
greatest Kazak revolt against the Russians. Another widespread uprising against the 
conscription of the Muslim inorodts/ to the imperial army, who were previously 
exempt of military service, started in 1916 throughout Turkestan, but the "Kazakh 
resistance there was even more widespread and better organized. "6 
Following the unsuccessful negotiations with the Khokand Government, Ala~ Orda 
organized the third Kazak Congress in Orenburg December 5-13, 1917 (just a few 
months after the Bolshevik Revolution in Petrograd), which proclaimed the autonomy 
of the Kazaks and elected an executive body headed by Alihan Bokeyhan-uh.7 This was 
the Kazakhs' first experience of independence after the decline of the Kazak Khanate. 
Being aware of the great role Islam played as the major link among all Central Asian 
peoples, Soviet leaders conducted an elaborate policy toward "the creation of Muslim 
republics and the consolidation of their republican, not ethnic identity. Culturally it 
appeared in policies aiming to create a new Soviet man, by suppression of Islam and 
Russification. "8 
The statute granted to the Kazaks on August 26, 1920, as the Autonomous Kirghiz 
Socialist Soviet Republic among other seventeen autonomous regions and republics of 
the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), was that of the 'union 
4 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, Stanford, 1987, p. 37. 
5 Jnorodtsy was a Russian term to denote the non-Russian and/or non-Orthodox Christian subjects of the 
Russian Empire. 
6 Ibid., p. 121. 
7 Istoryia Kazakhskoy SSR, Alma-Ata, 1943, p. 427; and G. Mel'nikov, Oktyabr' v Kazakhstane, Alma-
Ata: 1930, p. 21; both cited by Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Civil War and New Governments," in 
Edward Allworth (ed.), Central Asia, North Carolina, Durham, 1994, p. 236. 
8 Stephan Blank, "Soviet Reconquest of Central Asia," in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Central Asia: Its Strategic 
Importance and Future Prospects, New York, 1994, p. 40. 
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republic', which in theory allowed the right to separate from the RSFSR. 9 This stage of 
Soviet rule caused great economic and social upheaval among the Kazaks who had not 
recovered from the 1916 uprising yet. The severe famine of the 1920-1921, which 
caused the death of some one million10 Kazaks, did not allow them to organize sizeable 
resistance and made them dependant on the new regime. During the first years of Soviet 
rule in Kazakstan a great number of Kazak nomads opposing the new regime fled to the 
neighbouring regions of China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Iran. The capital of the 
Kirghiz [Kazak] ASSR, firstly seated in Orenburg in 1920, was moved on Ak Mescit 
(Qzil Orda) in 1924. The same year Orenburg was incorporated in the RSFSR as an 
oblast, whereas Syr Darya and Jetisu (Semirechye) oblasts were transferred into the 
Kirghiz ASSR from the Turkestan ASSR and in 1928, the capital was moved 
southward, this time to Vemyi, renamed Alma-Ata. 11 In 1932, the Karakalpak 
Autonomous oblast, then a part of Kirghiz ASSR, was attached to the RSFSR as the 
Karakalpak ASSR, and became a part of the Uzbek SSR in 1936.12 The name of the 
Kazak republic also succumbed changes: in 1925 the misnomer, the Kirgiz ASSR, was 
officially renamed the Kazak ASSR, which was again replaced by another misnomer 
Kazakh in 1936. 13 
The economic plight among the Kazaks, which was caused by long-lasting Civil 
war and terror by the new regime, was relatively lessened by the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) which was conducted during the first five years of 1920s. The delaying of 
nationalisation and allowance of limited ownership of land and livestock started to 
improve their well-being. After the death of Lenin in 1924 and the rise of Stalin as the 
9 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964, pp. 247-250. 
10 Ibid., p. 174. 
11 /storiya Kazakhstana, p. 400, and Elizabeth Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in 
Culture Change, New York, 1966, p. 117. 
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sole power-holder in the state, social and economic policy toward the Kazaks was as 
formidable as any time before: 
The cost of collectivisation campaign in terms of human and animal losses was calamitous: out of a 
Kazakh population of approximately 4,120,000 in 1930, some 1,750,000 had died from starvation, 
epidemics and executions by 1939- over 40 percent of the entire population (this is in addition to 
deaths from natural causes); 200,000 fled into neighbouring countries and remained there ... and 
453,000 took refuge in neighbouring Soviet republics, also to remain there permanently. 14 
On December 5, 1936,15 Kazakstan, along with the Kirghiz Republic, became a union 
republic of the Soviet Union. This union republic status, which presumed the nominal 
right to separation from the USSR, remained until December 1991. 
In 1923, the Soviet government adopted different Arabic alphabets for Uzbek, 
Kazak, and Kyrghyz, thus artificially complicating their communication and from 1925 
on, the importation of printed materials in the Arabic alphabet was forbidden. 16 In 
1928,17 the modified Latin alphabet was introduced for Central Asian languages, aiming 
to undermine the kinship among these languages and dialects and to create a new type 
of literate individual. However, the adoption of the Latin alphabet among Central Asian 
peoples became problematic after Turkey's adoption of the Latin alphabet, which meant 
that the Central Asian could easily follow Turkish press and publications. In 1939-1940, 
new Cyrillic script superseded the Latin script in the script of Central Asian 
languages. 18 
However, among all the impacts of the Soviet regime on the social, cultural, and 
political life of the Kazaks, the most detrimental one was the Soviets' deliberate 
demographic policy, which totally destroyed the ethnic composition of Kazakstan. 
12 I. Khodorov, "Natsional'noe razmezhevanie Srednei Azii," Novyi Vostok, No. 8/9 (1925), pp. 68ff; cited 
by d'Encausse, "The National Republics Lose their Independence," in Allworth (ed.), Central Asia, p. 
257. 
13 Shirin Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State, London, 1995, p. 36. 
14 M. B. Tatimov, Sotsial'naiya obuslovlennost' demograficheskikh protsessov, Alma-Ata, 1989, pp. 120-
26; cited by Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity, p. 45. 
15 d'Encausse, "The National Republics Lose Their Independence," p. 257. 
16 Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule, pp. 190-191. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 145. 
4 
During the period from 1931 to 1940, some 509,000 people migrated from other regions 
of the USSR through labour recruitment alone. 19 At the end of 1930s, several ethnic 
groups and nationalities were deported to Kazakstan, namely, the Volga Germans, 
Koreans from the Far East, Poles from the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. 
These forced migrations of non-Kazaks, along with the increasing number of non-Kazak 
labourers led to the radical decline of the ratio of Kazaks within the total population of 
Kazakstan. In 1939, the number of Kazaks had dropped by 20.5% since 1926 -
becoming 38% of the population; Russians became the major ethnic group within 
Kazakstan due to a 20% increase, making them 40.2% of the whole population. 20 This 
plight was sizeably worsened during the World War II: more than 450,00021 Kazaks 
were conscripted into the Soviet Army and some 536,00022 people were evacuated from 
western regions of the USSR to Kazakstan. In addition, 2.5 million German and 
Japanese prisoners of war had worked in Kazak territory until their return in 1950s.23 
Moreover, about 2 million people, mostly from the European part of the USSR came to 
cultivate 'Virgin Lands' during 1954-1962 and some 500,000 industrial construction and 
transportation workers had been recruited to work in Kazakstan, which -by 1959- raised 
the percentage of Russians to 42.7%.24 The number of Kazaks dropped by 8% and fell 
to the nadir of 30%.25 
After the appointment of Dinmuhamed Kunayev, an ethnic Kazak, as the first 
secretary of the Kazak Communist party in 1959, and especially after his appointment 
as the full member in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
19 L. S. Rogachevskaia, likvidatsiia bezrabotitsy v SSSR: 1917-1930 gg, Moscow, 1973, p. 88; cited by 
lstoriya Kazakhstana, p. 402. 
20 Istoriya Kazakhstana, p. 402. 
21 Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 188. 
22 Istoriya Kazakhstana, p. 403. 
23 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 18 June 1989; cited by Istoriya Kazakhstana, p. 403. 
24 Istoriya Kazakhstana, p. 403. 
25 Ibid. 
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the Soviet Union in April 1971,26 the participation of the Kazaks in the government and 
their process of urbanisation increased: "whereas in 1964 only 33 percent of the 
members of the Council of Ministers were Kazakh, by 1981 Kazakhs held 60 percent of 
the posts, and the Kazakh share of the ministerial and state chair positions increased 
~~;H,~l;lc_ 
from 39 to 61 percent."27 After 1970s, the disparity between Russians and Kazaks began 
to decrease due to the greater natural increase of population among the Kazaks and 
migration between republics. The average number of children under 18 in a Central 
Asian family was 5.7, while that of the RSFSR was only 3.8.28 During 1978-89, the rate 
of increase of Kazaks was 23.5% and that of Russians was (-3.9)%.29 In 1970, the 
number of Kazaks reached 4,234,000 (32.6% of the population), while Russians 
amounted 5,522,000 (42.5%) and Ukrainians, the third largest ethnic group, amounted 
to 933,000 (7.2%).30 This demographic process was also spurred by a wave of Kazaks 
who returned from other republics of the USSR, and later also from other countries: just 
during 1991-92, 41,000 Kazaks came from Mongolia. 31 
On December 17, 1986, following the removal of Kunayev from his post as First 
Secretary of the Kazak Communist Party, who on charges of 'tribalism' and 'tribal 
protectionism', 32 and of ongoing corruption throughout the republic, he was replaced by 
Gennadiy Kolbin, an ethnic Russian, with no former experience in Kazakstan. Upon 
these developments, mass riots of university students began in the main square of 
Almaty. These December riots, also known as Jeltoksan (December), represented the 
peak of the manifestation of Kazak national consciousness during the Soviet period. 
26 Edward All worth, "The New Central Asians," in All worth (ed.), Central Asia, p. 552. 
27 Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 244. 
28 All worth, "The New Central Asians," p. 540. 
29 Istoriya Kazakhstana, p. 406. 
30 ltogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970g, vol. 4, Moscow: 1973, p. 13; cited by /storiya 
Kazakhstana, p. 404. 
31 Ibid., p. 405. 
32 All worth, "The New Central Asians," p. 564. 
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On the eve of its 'catapult' to independence, Kazakstan still remained a mostly 
Slav-populated state and its native Kazak population seriously suffered from the Soviet 
policy of Russification. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and especially after the 
formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) the new republic was 
'kld,,-....i.... 
anticipated to become Russia's 'younger brother' with no other option but tacitly to 
""'<."d"'~ s;'~ 
accept Russian intrusion. In fact, the position of the Kazak President, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, who always sounded eager for integration and cooperation in the former 
Soviet space and fuh~·~\;t"'of several 'odd' ideas, obviously generated such an 
impression. Kazakstan is the only Central Asian state that has direct borders with 
Russia. Kazakstan was the only Soviet-successor state where the titular nation did not of 
an consist absolute majority. Also, Kazakstan has no direct land borders with non-CIS 
Muslim states. Under these circumstances, it was anticipated that the only way of 
survival for Kazakstan as an independent state -or even as a nation- was the satisfaction 
of Russian aspirations, and by not causing any discontent among the republic's Russian 
population, which might lead to armed conflicts or even war, as had happened in 
Georgia and Moldova. 
In this present work, I attempt to present the peculiar way of Kazak foreign and 
domestic policies, which makes the republic completely different from the other former 
Soviet states. My basic argument in this work is that Kazak regional policy has two 
completely opposite sides: one that is presented and pronounced by Kazak official and 
another in the way of its implementation, which, for the most part, contradicts the 
rhetoric of the leaders. Contrary to what many scholars have argued for several years, I 
assert that Kazakstan's foreign policy actions are not just simultaneous reactions to 
current events, but an astute and well-planned policy, which is the greatest difference 
7 
between Kazakstan's policy and that of other Central Asian states. Other peculiar 
features of Kazak foreign policy are its versatility and flexibility. 
In this work, I focus on regional policy and foreign relations of Kazakstan, 
dwelling on Russia and the CIS structure (chapter I), China and the Central Asian states 
(chapter II), and the Islamic World -Turkey, the ECO countries (Iran, Pakistan), and 
the Middle East (the Arab World, Palestine and Israel)- (chapter III). 
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CHAPTER I: RUSSIA AND KAZAKSTAN: IS BIG BROTHER STILL 
WATCHING? 
1. The Soviet legacy and present-day Kazakstan 
Throughout its history, the Russian state remained a Eurasian power which aimed at 
becoming a mighty and respectable European power, which was supported by its Asian 
colonies. The Russian Empire enjoyed its superior status at the crossroad of trading 
routes between rich eastern countries such as India, China, and Persia, and Western 
Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of several 
independent states, Russia lost its direct control, at least nominally, over those new 
states. In this regard, according to a number of geostrategic, socio-economic, and 
demographic features, the Republic of Kazakstan (RK) represents a unique case among 
the republics of the former USSR. As Tatiana Shaumian asserts, there are three essential 
geopolitical peculiarities in Russian policy toward the new states: 
In the first place, the Central Asian republics form a natural and highly controlled buffer between 
Russia and the other countries of Asia. Secondly, a thorny legacy of the past decades of Moscow's 
supremacy consists of the vast Russian diaspora that has occurred throughout these states .... Lastly, 
special types of essential economic links have been established between Russia and the Central Asian 
states during the Soviet period.33 
Although the above-mentioned circumstances are true of all Soviet successor states in 
Central Asia, they have an even stronger meaning for Kazakstan. Firstly, the Republic 
of Kazakstan is the only Central Asian state that has direct borders with the Russian 
Federation (RF). Therefore, Kazakstan could be regaded as Russia's passage to the 
Central Asian Muslim states. Secondly, for a very long period, Kazakstan had been a 
state where the titular nation consisted of less than 50 % of the total population and 
Slavs along with so-called 'Russian-speakers' (russkoyazychnye) had amounted to the 
absolute majority. Thirdly, the Kazak economy, formerly the most industrialized 
9 
Central Asian state and huge mineral resources, has been hampered by the collapse of 
the Union-wide industrial machine which could function only with the contribution of 
all its units throughout the USSR. 
A. Economic interdependence 
Among all newly independent Central Asian states, Kazakstan became the first one 
which was fully integrated into the Russian economy. At the beginning, Kazakstan was 
the meat and wool provider for Russian industry, but later the Kazak pasturelands 
attracted more Russian peasants emancipated from serfdom in 1861. Russia's economic 
domination was buttressed by the building of the Orenburg-Tashkent railroad line, 
which made possible the development of heavy industry, notably mining and 
metallurgy. Since the collapse of the USSR and destruction of the common economic 
space among the Soviet states and, to some extent other socialist states of the 
COMECON, the economies and industries of particular states were cut off from their 
former partners. In addition, the ongoing process of privatization exacerbeted the 
situation because it was mostly carried out with no sense of technial or economic logic. 
After achieving independence, the creation of a viable economic system and 
improvement the population's everyday life became key aspect of Nazarbayev's policy. 
His crafty rhetoric about becoming the next 'Asian Tiger' by explorong of the country's 
mineral resources, had excited the Kazakstanis who started to anticipate their 'bright 
future'. In practice, the Kazak economy seemed to be split:34 the industrialized north, 
which is closely related to the southern Siberian economic system of Russia and the 
agriculture-dominated south of the republic. On the eve of the break-up of the USSR, 
Kazakstan, the second largest republic by its territory after the RSFSR, possessed a 
33 Tatiana Shaumian, "Foreign Policy Perspectives of the Central Asian States," in Touraj Atabaki and 
John O'Kane (eds.), Post-Soviet Central Asia, London and New York, 1998, p.65. 
34 John Anderson, The International Relations of Central Asia, Manchester, 1997, p. 115. 
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work force of 6.5 million, of which 21.4 % were engaged in the industrial sector.35 The 
republic was one of the prominent producers of grain, yielding 17 % of the whole 
Soviet grain production. 36 The former Soviet machine-building industry, 70 % of which 
later passed to the RF, was dependent on Kazakstan's and Central Asian non-ferrous 
metals, where it obtained half of its need. 37 As was righteously noted, "raw materials 
from the South are indispensable requisites for Russia's development. "38 As shown by 
the process of the Soviet state-building, Russia remained the center where most of 
manufacturing plants were located. The local industry in Kazakstan had a 
complementary inclination: Kazakstani industrial plants were projected to process rich 
local raw materials and produce interim goods to feed factories in Russia. 
For Kazakstan, as for any other Central Asian state, Russia perceives its status as a 
major trading partner and supplier of basic goods: "this trade is proportionately more 
significant in the economies of the fourteen other successor states than vice versa (that 
is, regional trade represents a smaller share of Russia's total trade and of its total 
GDP). "39 In the case of Kazakstan, Russia provided 68 % of the republic's total imports 
and imported 53 % of its exports in 1992,40 the first year of the republic's independence. 
More importantly, the oil and gas sectors of Kazakstan which were regarded as the main 
breeders of the economy, were themselves severely dependent on Russian refineries and 
pipelines. The exigency of energy and refined fuel could have paralyzed the country's 
economy. At the heyday of the Soviet Union, Kazakstan was one of the main producers 
of advanced weapons and military technology, producing some 11 % of the Soviet 
35 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security, 
Washington, D.C., 1996, (hereafter CANS),p. 65. 
36 Daniel C. Diller, Russia and the Independent States, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 253. 
37 E.F. Morozov, "Bol'shoy Yevraziyskiy Proekt," Russkiy geograficheskiy sbomik, No. 2 [ n.p., n.d.], p. 
21. 
38 Ibid., p. 2 l. 
39 Philip G. Roeder, "From Hierarchy to Hegemony: The Post-Soviet Security Complex," in David A. 
Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, University Park, 
Pennsylvania, 1997, p. 23 l. 
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military production. 41 However, after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the USSR and the 
end of the Cold War, most of the factories could not carry on production. The sharp 
decline in production among Kazakstan's union-wide industries caused a great wave of 
social discontent as a reaction to great unemployment and delay of salary payments. The 
republic could not cope up with this problem: it neither was able to arrange clients 
abroad nor able to convert the industry to supply civil local demand. As a result, many 
large factories were privatized for very low prices and sold to people who were not 
capable of creating an economically feasible enterprise. 
The leadership of Kazakstan needed to face this problem of economic dependence 
on Russia. The creation of a viable economy and social and economic welfare for every 
Kazakstani citizen was a vital requirement for the state-survival. Social discontent could 
exacerbate already existing extreme separatist or reactionary movements. Therefore, the 
continuation, or at least less painful transformation, of the republic's economy was one 
of the main, if not the main, aspects of the republic's foreign policy. In short, one can 
easily find economic intentions in every step of Nazarbayev's policies. 
B. Russia and military sites 
As Irina Zviagelskaia has stated, Russia did not perceive Central Asia as a region of 
special (or primary) importance, with the exception of Kazakstan. 42 So what makes 
Kazakstan the matter of special importance for Russia? Apart from the presence of a 
large Russian population there and rich oil reserves, as well as Kazakstan' s key geo-
strategic position, there is a more pragmatic reason for Russia that directly affects the 
security and defence of the Russian Federation. During the Soviet period, and 
particularly during the Second World War period, when most of the west of the USSR 
fell under German control, Kazakstan became the center of military production due to 
40 Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, London, 1995, p. 22. 
41 Olcott, CANS, p. 65. 
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its rich mineral resources, infrastructure and geographic location. Some of the military 
plants located on the territory of the Kazak SSR were the most prominent throughout 
the union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the 
independent republic of Kazakstan, the military sites located on Kazak soil became the 
property of the new state. 
Among many military industrial and testing sites located in Kazakstan, which had 
vital importance for the USSR to become and remain a superpower, the most prominent 
and well-known ones were the Semipalatinsk nuclear test-site, the Baykonur space and 
missile center, and ICBM bases with early warning radar systems. 
The Semipalatinsk nuclear test-site, which was established in 1948 encompassed an 
area of 18,000 square kilometers.43 The test-site had remained the heart of the Soviet 
nuclear armament project as the only underground test-site in the USSR until August 
29, 1991,44 when it was officially closed by a decree of the Kazak President 
Nazarbayev. The nuclear tests carried out at the test-site caused enormous ecological 
disaster, the damages of which have not been eliminated yet. It is not accidental that 
one of the first, and then obviously the strongest, political movements in Kazakstan was 
the Nevada-Semey (Semipalatinsk) Antinuclear organization led by prominent Kazak 
writer Oljas Suleymenov. During the 43 years of its functioning some 459 nuclear 
explosions, of which were 113 in the atmosphere, were carried out at the site. It was 
estimated that during this period more than 500,000 Kazakstanis had been exposed to 
radiation.45 Deprived of the major nuclear test-site and not being able to afford the 
construction of another one on its own soil, Russia became an ardent supporter of the 
42 Zviagelskaia, p. 1. 
43 "The IAEA Expertise on the Semipalatinsk Test-Site," Argumenty ifakty-Kazakhshtan, No. 2-3, 
January 1995, p.3; cited by Murat Laumulin, Foreign Policy and Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Almaty, 1997, p.30. 
44 David T. Twining, The New Eurasia: A Guide to the Republic of the Former Soviet Union, Westport, 
Connecticut, 1993, p. 184. 
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limitation of nuclear tests following the collapse of the USSR. Strong public opinion in 
Kazakstan, bolstered by well-organized anti-nuclear organizations, prevented Russian 
pressure on Kazakstan to reopen the site. 
By the collapse of the USSR, Kazakstan inherited two Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile (ICBM) bases: at Jang1z-Tobe and Derzhavinsk, both comprising 104 SS-18 
missiles, an airbase of 40 TU-95 heavy bombers, and arelated radar base.46 In addition 
to the ICBMs, Kazakstan obtained some 1,410 nuclear warheads47, which were 
designed to be carried by the bomber aircraft. The possession of nuclear missiles and 
warheads made Kazakstan one of the four former Soviet nuclear states (in addition to 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, and the first (and only at that time) Muslim nuclear state. 
This status as a nuclear power gave the republic some bargaining power, especially in 
getting foreign aid and security guarantees. During the December 1991 meeting of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the four Soviet-successor nuclear states 
agreed to ship the nuclear weapons located in Kazakstan, Ukraine, and Belarus to 
Russia for dismantling by July 1, 1992.48 Kazakstan's position to become a non-nuclear 
state was again approved during the Tashkent meeting of the CIS members on May 15, 
1992.49 
Another important question in post-Soviet Russo-Kazak relations was that of the 
future status of aerospace and military installations located in Kazakstan, the most 
important of which was the Baykonur space center·. The Baykonur space center, which 
quite surprisingly retained its Turkic name despite the fact of being one of the greatest 
45 L.K. Bakayev and N.O. Urpekov, Voyennaya i vneshnyaya bezopasnost' Kazakhstana na poroge XX/ 
veka, Almaty, 1998, p. 35. 
46 Laumulin, p. 30. 
47 R. Jeffrey Smith, "3 Former Soviet Republic Meet U.S. Army Terms," Washington Post, April 27, 
1992; cited by Twining, p. 18. 
48 "An Agreement Between the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic 
Forces," Moscow TASS, 09:25 GMT, 31Dec1991 in FBIS-SOV-91-251, 31December1991, pp. 17-18; 
cited by Twining, p. 13. 
49 Twining, pp. 148-149. 
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achievements of Great October, again had vital importance for Russia which could not 
afford another such center, and whose continuation of space programs depended on the 
implementation of commercial launches for foreign companies. On the other hand, the 
Baykonur center was a matter of a state-esteem for the Republic of Kazakstan, which 
nonetheless engaged in the space programs- a unique status among other CIS countries, 
with the exception of Russia. However, the republic had neither the financial nor the 
technological facilities to conduct them by itself. 
The status of Baykonur was regulated by the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Mutual Assistance between Russia and Kazakstan, signed on May 25, 1992, in 
Moscow. Among a number of different issues covered by the agreement, 'the common 
use of military installations' including 'the joint use of the Baykonur cosmodrome' were 
agreed upon. 50 The agreement on the lease of the space center was signed on March 28, 
1994,51 after a series of negotiations between Russia and Kazakstan. According to the 
agreement, Baykonur legally belongs to Kazakstan and would be leased to Russia for a 
period of 20 years starting from January 1994 for $115 million rent per annum; also, the 
Russian side assured the Kazaks that the center would not become a "Russian military 
base. "52 But the 'lucrative' agreement for Kazakstan has never been fully implemented: 
the rent agreement was not officially ratified by Russian authorities and the Russian 
government always delayed the rent payment. The Baykonur case became a problem in 
Russo-Kazak relations after the explosion and crash of the Russian 'Proton' rocket on 
July 5, 1999, when fragments fell on the settlement of Alasu in the Karaganda region.53 
The Kazak government banned the launch of 'Proton'-class carrier rocketso and also 
50 Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, London, 1994, p. 124; 
and Ivan Ivanov, "Treaty Signed," /TAR-TASS, 16:45 GMT, 25 May 1992 in FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 
1992, p. 14; cited by Twining, pp. 149-150. 
51 "Status at Baikonur after Agreement Viewed," in FBIS-SOV-015-5, 24 January 1995, p. 27; cited by 
Shireen Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, Westport, Connecticut, 1996, p. 121. 
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demanded damage compensation and all rent to be paid on time- as well as offering 
amendments to the original agreement. Considering the issue, director of the Kazak 
National Aerospace Agency Meirbek Moldabekov told that, "without the fulfilment of 
these conditions, we have no legal or moral right to resume Proton launches. "54 
The explosion and crash of the 'Proton' rocket55 frustrated the prestige of the 
Russian aerospace industry, while the Kazak government did not intend to concede. 
After lengthy negotiations involving the two countries' top politicians, the leasing 
agreement was rectified in accordance with Kazak demands: in addition to 1999's rent 
of $115 million, which had already been paid, Russia was obliged to pay 57 million 
Tenge as compensation for the Proton accident damage. 56 Also, Kazakstan was now to 
participate in commercial launches from Baykonur beginning in the second half of the 
year 2000. In 1999, the total value of commercial launches from Baykonur was 
estimated at around $1 billion. 57 
During the first week of June 2000 another agreement on the leasing of several 
military arms-testing sites was considered by the Kazak parliament. The agreements 
signed in 1995 regulated the lease terms of four weapon testing sites on the territory of 
Kazakstan, specializing in anti-aircraft and air-defence missiles, for a period of 10 
years. The important aspect of the agreement is that some $24.3 million of total $27.5 
million annual rent was to be paid by arms, military technology, and education of Kazak 
military staff at Russian military establishments. 58 Still, Kazakstan enjoys its legal 
possession of the Baykonur center and 'membership' into the 'space club'. Many Kazaks 
52 "Baykonur Will Become a Military Base," in FBIS-SOV-95-006, 10 January 1995, p. 27; cited by 
Hunter, p. 121. 
53 /TAR-TASS, 09:35 GMT, 2 Nov 1999; in FBIS-SOV-1999-1102 .. 
54 "Kazakhstan Urges Lifting of Russian Proton Rocket Ban," in FBIS-SOV-1999-0803. 
55 The July 5, 1999 accident was not the first; another Proton crashed on June 5, 1998; see "Kazakhstan 
Wants Damages for Russia's Rocket Accident," in FBlS-SOV-1999-1102. 
56 "Kazakhstan to Carry Out Space Projects with Russia," in FBIS-SOV-200-0120. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Panorama (Almaty), No. 22, 02 June 2000. 
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are employed in Baykonur's space programs and two Kazaks- one of them, Talgat 
Musabayev, who led an international Russian-French crew- have already participated in 
Russian space voyages. 
C. Kazakstan and the formation of the CIS 
The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Sodruzhestvo 
nezavisimykh gosudarstv) following the de jure and de facto collapse of the Soviet 
Union has usually been regarded as the prolongation of Russian imperial policy by 
seeking to maintain Russian influence within the area of the former Soviet Union. 
Surely, the agreements and negotiations of the commonwealth are directly related with 
Russia's 'global' ambitions and regulations, notably: the division of the Soviet debts, 
possession of Soviet assets abroad, nuclear and conventional weapons, economic 
regulations, the 'ruble zone', etc. It is beyond doubt that the formation of the CIS would 
help Russia to harmonize and control the participants' policies and obtain some 14 new 
allies in the international community. The formation of the CIS was regarded as a result 
of Russian initiative or a brain-child of Russia's genius policy-making in order to regain 
the influence in the former USSR. As Martha Brill Olcott argues, the CIS was "an ideal 
way for policymakers in Moscow to supervise, if not control outright, economic and 
security policies in former Soviet territories. "59 M.B.O. also asserts that the CIS was a 
device to advance Russian goals as far as "the constituent member states of the CIS 
were still unaccustomed to exercising their own sovereignty. "60 But, in fact, this idea is 
unable to explain the initially ardent endeavour of the Central Asian states at first to 
preserve the Soviet Union, and later to integrate at the maximum available level under 
the umbrella of the CIS. Kazakstan under president Nazarbayev, the most ardent 
supporter of integration and creator of many related innovations, had conducted a policy 
59 Olcott, CANS, p. 44. 
60 Ibid. 
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that was more pro-integrative than that of Russia. So what forced the president to play a 
role that helped Russia to 'supervise, if not control outright, economic and security 
policies" in Kazakstan? 
The pro-integration policy of the Kazak President Nazarbayev seems, in fact, not to 
be a tacit allegiance to an all-powerful, in that the CIS provided some advantages to the 
Kazak leadership. Firstly, the establishment of the CIS made Nazarbayev a Union-wide 
respected politician trying to preserve the glorious union and its 'good old days'. In the 
last days of the USSR, it has been rumoured that Nazarbayev was to become the prime 
minister of the USSR or even the president. Secondly, Nazarbayev, as almost all of the 
NIS's presidents, was a Moscow appointee during the Soviet time. The collapse of the 
whole system could weaken his legitimacy. Meanwhile, the rise of presidents 
Gamsakhurdia and El~ibey who did not emerge from the Communist Party structure 
probably scared him. The growing national awakening throughout the former USSR 
caused violent ethnic conflicts in some republics. As far as Central Asia is concerned, 
according to the Institute of Geography at the Russian Academy of Sciences, there are 
at least at least 19 zones of dispute.61 In these terms, preserving the status quo would be 
the only reasonable way to prevent national separatism and social unrest, which might 
directly undermine the ruling power. 
Another important reason for Kazakstan's deeper integration with Russia and the 
rest of the former USSR, was its lack of preparation and inability to conduct a 
favourable foreign and domestic policy, and to create a state system at home with all of 
its required components. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet, any effort of the 
republic to be involved in foreign policy activities could worsen its international 
61 Moskovskie Novosti, 17 March 1991; cited by Zviagelskaia, p. 9. 
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position since then the republic's foreign ministry consisted of only thirty people. 62 All 
administrative organs in the republic, including ministries, were simply the local 
branches of all-Soviet organs located in Moscow. The local administration was never 
obliged, nor alowed, to conduct its own policy. Rather, the local administration carried 
out orders strictly in accordance with Moscow's instructions. The formation of viable 
governmental, administrative, and military bodies needed time and enormous financial 
resources. Therefore, the CIS could have become for Kazakstan an umbrella that might 
protect it from the lethal side of independent state-building during this transitional 
period. 
For, Russia the establishment of the CIS would create a legitimate base for its 
control, especially in the case of dispatching nuclear weapons, economic interactions, 
and military presence. Irina Zviagelskaia has noted that one of the main Russian 
interests in the former Soviet territories is "the prevention of a vacuum that can be filled 
with forces hostile to Russia. "63 
Kazakstan, which a Russian analyst called as an "indispensable member of any 
future federation or confederation, "64 had played an important role in the creation of the 
CIS and was an initiator of many of its cooperation projects. Initially, the CIS was to 
become a union of Slavic states, when the Slavic troika -Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine-
signed the Treaty of the Formation of the CIS in Minsk on December 8, 1991. 
Paradoxically, these three countries were the original signatories of the founding 
constitution of the USSR in 1922.65 But it was Kazakstan's president Nazarbayev who 
pretended to create a Central Asian union as a counterbalance of the Slavic one. Olcott 
suggestes that the specter of the Slavic-Turkic rivalry was one of the reasons why the 
62 Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 
(Summer 1992), p. 120. 
63 Zviagelskaia, p. 8. 
64 Ibid, p. 36. 
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Slavic CIS allowed the widening of the CIS membership.66 Therefore, it was not a 
surprise that this treaty, which created the 'greater CIS', was signed at the then Kazak 
capital, Almaty, on December 21, 1991. 
One of the fundamental pillars of the CIS system was the Treaty on Collective 
Security signed in Tashkent May 15, 1992, by Kazakstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Armenia. 67 Two important articles of the treaty, articles 1 
and 4, stated that any aggression against any of the participating states would be 
perceived as that against all participating states and in such a case, other participating 
states would give every necessary assistance, including military support.68 Another 
important aspect of the treaty, which directly affected the foreign policy inclination of 
the participating states, was that the treaty did not allow treaty participants "to enter any 
alliance or engage in any action which may be directed against another participating 
state. "69 In addition to the main treaty, another protocol of the use on the CIS 
multinational peacekeeping force in interethnic conflicts was signed on July 16, 1992, 
in Tashkent.70 The Treaty on Collective Security was initially planned to be 
comprehensive in nature, by defining the exterior border of the participating states as 
the border of the CIS, thereby its defence obligating to the CIS armed force 
jurisdiction;71 as well other CIS states to join the treaty.72 The Republic of Kazakstan 
fully relied on the possibility of the creation of the common CIS armed forces and did 
not endeavour to form its own. Not surprisingly, the Kazak Ministry of Defence was 
65 Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," p. 108. 
66 Olcott, CANS, p. 54. 
67 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Russia and the Geopolitics of the Muslim South," in Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), 
Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics, Gainsville, 
Florida, 1994, p. 285. 
68 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 May 1992, p. 2; and Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 23 May 1992; both cited by 
Mesbahi, "Russia and Geopolitics," p. 285. 
69 Amin Saikal, "Russia and Central Asia," in Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds.), Russia in Search 
for its Future, Melbourne, 1995, p. 149. 
70 T . . 15 wmmg,p .. 
71 Mesbahi, "Russia and Geopolitics," p. 286. 
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established in May 1992. 73 The Commonwealth also signed a number of treaties and 
regulations on economic issues, such as an accord on free trade and customs union 
signed in March 1992, 74 the October 1994 agreements on greater economic 
integration,75 the October 9, 1992 Bishkek summit on the preservation of the 'ruble 
zone', 76 etc. 
For Kazakstan, as for most of the CIS countries, the Commonwealth provides 
several economic, political, and some military advantages, while not forcing to give up 
state sovereignty or to pay heavy costs. First, it retains the Russian nuclear umbrella. In 
the word of its then foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, Russia "has an historic duty to 
guard the border because it is a frontier of the CIS. "77 Second, Russia, affraid of the 
social unrest that can affect the fate of Russians or the security of Russia itself, became 
a potential ally against nationalist domestic opposition. Russia was never concerned-
contrary to external powers- with the ethics and ideology, 78 thus giving the local ruling 
elite freedom of movement. Third, the reestablishment of new-imperial policy over the 
CIS countries obliged Russia to make direct financial contribution to the ruling elite of 
the republics 79 and to provide "some level of social welfare, "80 to satisfy local 
expectations from the CIS- hard burben for Russia.burden for Russia. Lastly, the 
establishment of the CIS allotted extra time to Kazakstan to carry out many financial 
and administrative tasks, which needed long requiring long plannings and resources, 
such as the preservation of a national currency, establishment of I isto planning and 
72 T . . 14 wmmg,p. . 
73 Philip Petersen, "Security Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia," European Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 
1995), p. 161. 
74 Diller, p. 181. 
75 Vladimir Barsamov, "Kazakhstan: How Long Can Ethnic Harmony Last?" in Alexei Arbatov et al. 
(eds.), Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1997, p. 315. 
76 Twining, p. 22. 
77 lnteifax, 16 March 1994; and !TAR-TASS, 3 November 1994; both cited by Roeder, p. 222. 
78 Hunter, p. 122; and Roeder, pp. 236-238. 
79 Roeder, pp. 236-238. 
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resources, such as the preservation of its national currency, establishment of a new state 
apparatus and formation of a military body, etc. 
In fact, the CIS could not become a device to control the so-called "near abroad" 
mostly because Russia was not able to afford this burden, though again it prevented the 
former Soviet states from joining other alliances and blocs. The preservation of the 
ruble zone delayed, and even frustrated, economic reforms in Russia. 81 The issue of a 
Kazak currency, Tenge, which is now one of the most stable national currencies among 
post-Soviet states, gradually set the Kazak economy free of Russian influence. By early 
1996, the debts of the CIS countries to Russia amounted to $9 billion, 82 while the 
Russian economy was still in severe crisis. Under these circumstances the CIS could not 
become a fully functioning body, while de jure it still exists. Furthermore, the 
cooperation at regional level, especially bilateral ones became a more pragmatic way for 
the post-Soviet cooperation. Although the de facto CIS period of the Russo-Kazak 
relations has been replaced by greater bilateral relations, Russia still remains "partner 
number one" 83 for Kazakstan. Today the republic has become accustomed to its 
independence and is able to conduct polices in its own favour. Ironically, President 
Nazarbayev is still the most ardent supporter of the CIS integration- save President 
Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan. However, his efforts aim mostly to calm down the 
growing discontent of the Kazakstani Russian population, to obtain the support of the 
pro-Sovietists within the countries, and to preserve the benevolence of the Russian 
80 Olcott, CANS, p. 143. 
81 Report of the Center of International Studies, Moscow Institute of International Relations, Moscow, 
September 1992, p. 17; cited by Zviagelskaia, p. 23. 
82 /zvestiya, 16 September, 1993[1996?], cited by Roeder, p. 231. 
83 "Kazakhstan: Kazakh President Says Russia 'Partner Number One'," in FBIS-SOV-98-257, 14 
September 1998. 
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rulers. By pressing for the state's survival, it is clear "the survival of the state itself is an 
essential precondition for the leader's own survival. "84 
In sum, it is necessary to evaluate the eagerness of Kazakstan towards integration 
and Nazarbayev's own statement that, "integration and cooperation for the CIS countries 
is not only for economic profit, but, so far, it is an absolutely inevitable state of spiritual 
and psychological stability and confidence about tomorrow. "85 In the context of above 
analysis , one finds that is not so difficult to answer Philip Roeder's paradoxical 
question "why some successor states have not simply acquiesced, but enthusiastically 
encouraged growth of the relationship that underpin Russia's hegemony."86 
2. The Russians in Kazakstan and the demographic structure 
As Philip Roeder has rightly noted, the most important security problem for the 
former Soviet states is their 'Russia problem'. 87 This problem and its perils are greater 
for Kazakstan than any other Soviet-successor state: Kazakstan has a more than 7,000 
km-long88 border with Russia; Russia has a population that is 9 times greater than that 
of Kazakstan, and a GDP 13 times, and as large an armed forces 38 times larger. 89 It has 
also immense number of ethnic Russians, which even outnumbered the Kazak 
population during the Soviet period. Under these circumstances it is inevitable to recall 
the favourite words of the second president of the Turkish Republic, ismet inonii, whose 
witty policy saved the country from being actively involved in the World War II: "the 
greatest danger is the nearest one." By January 1, 1995, the Kazaks amounted to 44 % 
84 Roeder, p. 221. 
85 Qasymjomart Tokayev, Pod styagom nezavisimosti: Ocherki o vneshney politike Kazakhstana, Almaty, 
1997, p. 47. 
86 Roeder, p. 227. 
87 Ibid., p. 222. 
88 Zviagelskaia, p. 2. 
89 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1995; and International Institute of Strategic Studies; both cited by 
Roeder, p. 231. 
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of the republic's total population, while that of Russians dropped to 36 %.90 Due to 
certain political, economic, and demographic circumstances, notably, the broad exodus 
of ethnic Russians and Germans, immigration of ethnic Kazaks from abroad, greater 
natural birthrate of Kazaks, along with the policy of 'Kazakization' and pro-Kazak 
favouritism conducted by the ruling elite of the republic, it is anticipated that Kazaks 
will make up more than 60 % of the republic's population by the year 2015.91 As Olcott 
argued: "the state can continue to exist as a home for Kazakhs only to the degree that 
Russia permits it to do so. "92 But still, the problem of Russians in Kazakstan, which 
outnumber the ethnic Kazaks in five northern and eastern districts of the republic, 
remains the vital and most influential overtone in most of the republic's political -
affairs- both foreign and domestic. Similarly, the problem of Russians in Kazakstan is 
vital both to the Russian state as well as to Kazakstani Russians themselves. Any radical 
worsening of the status quo may create an enormous area of instability beside the 
Russian border and directly affect the fate of Russians in central and southern parts of 
the republic. 
It is not surprising, that the first foreign minister of the post-Soviet Russia, Andrey 
Kozyrev, described the non-Russian former Soviet space in his first official statement as 
"something that could be called the 'near' abroad."93 The concept of so-called 'near 
abroad' (blizhnee zarubezh'e), comprising the fourteen USSR-successor states, claimed 
to legitimize Russian political, military, and economic domination. In addition, another 
term, Russian-speakers (russkoya:zychnye), came to be used in the official Russian 
lexicon. The term meant Russians plus non-titular ethnic groups whose native language 
90 Olcott, CANS, pp. 60-61. 
91 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11 August 1992; cited by Olcott, CANS, p. 61. 
92 Martha Brill Olcott, "Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: The Demographics of Ethnic Politics," Problems of 
Post-Communism, Vol. 42, Issue 2 (March-April 1995), in EBSCOhost database. 
93 Andrey Kozyrev, "Transformed Russia in a New World," Jzvestiya, 2 January 1992 in FBIS-SOV-
RUSSIA, 2 January 1992, p. 78; cited by Alvin Z. Rubenstein, "The Transformation of Russian Foreign 
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was not that of the titular group. Under these circumstances, a Georgian or a Greek 
living in Kazakstan was denoted as a Russian-speaker and immediately supposed to be 
concern of the Russians. The Russian foreign minister Kozyrev has stated, that 
"protecting the human rights of Russians abroad is his primary foreign policy goal with 
respect to the other CIS countries .... if necessary, Russia would use force to protect the 
rights of Russians in other states. "94 This statement was boistered by President Yeltsin 
claiming that international organizations should grant Russia exclusive power to protect 
peace and stability in the post-Soviet area.95 This Russian attitude towards the Russians 
in Kazakstan became the sine qua non of support for both right and left-oriented 
Russians, from Yeltsin to Nemtsov, from Solzhenitsyn to Zhirinovsky. Almost every 
Russian politician had ever criticized the policy of the Kazak government toward the 
Russians. It was reported that during the Almaty talks in 1992, president Yeltsin 
expressed the idea that Russia has certain territorial claims on Kazakstan. 96 The 
prominent Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn claimed that "the optimal solution is 
Union between the three Slavic republics and Kazakhstan. '.97 As a respond to 
ultranationalist claims emerged among the Russian politicians, Nazarbayev stressed that 
"it is now impossible to restore the Soviet state in its old borders without violence. "98 
The Russians in Kazakstan are spread throughout the republic's border. Although the 
five northern regions are predominantly populated by Russians, but they had never 
formed an ethnic Russian territorial or administrative formation, like the Trans-Dniester 
region in Moldova. One of the leading foreign policy experts in Kazakstan, Dr. Murat 
Laumulin, placed the problem of increasing Russian nationalism and its attempts to 
Policy," in Karen Dawisha (ed.), The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transition in Russia 
and the New States of Eurasia, Armonk, New York, 1997, p. 45. 
94 Diller, p. 196. 
95 'Russia' TV Channel, Moscow, 28 February 1993 in BBC Monitoring: Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 
March 1993, pp. Bl-B2; cited by Mesbahi, "Russia and Geopolitics," p. 305. 
96 "The National Doctrine of Russia," Obozrevatel' (1994); cited by Barsamov, pp. 312-333. 
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redraw the republic's borders by incorporating some northern districts into the Russian 
Federation, on the top of the external developments affecting Kazakstan's security. 99 
Meanwhile the 'Russia or Russians problem' is defining the Kazak way of state-
building, foreign and domestic policies, and will certainly continue to define it in the 
near future. 
A. The Cossacks 
There are a number of ethnic Russian groups and organizations, predominantly or 
absolutely (while according to Kazak legal prescriptions it is forbidden to form an 
organization consisting of exclusively one ethnic group) consisting of ethnic Slavs and 
Russians. Many of them deal with the general socio-economic and cultural problems of 
Russians, seeking for the amelioration of economic well-being, the status of the Russian 
language, and equality in social life. In fact, some of these organizations have much in 
common with some Kazak organizations and parties. The Republican Social Slavic 
Movement "LAD" (Harmony) (respublikanskoe obshchestvennoe slavyanskoe 
dvizheniye LAD), led by Aleksandra Dokuchaeva and the Russian community of 
Kazakstan (Russkaya obshchina Kazakhstana), led by Yuriy Bunakov, are among the 
most influential Russian organizations. These groups deal with the problems of 
Russians in Kazakstan, i.e. they do not have a Pan-Russian vision which distinguishes 
them from those within the Russian Federation. Moreover, they usually do not commit 
ultranationalist or separatist policy. However, have insisted on cultural and 
administrative self-rule. Many of the Kazakstani Russians, especially those whose 
ancestors have lived there for many generations, have a weak national identity that 
97 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Russian Question: At the End of the 20'h Century, London, 1995, p. 93. 
98 FBIS-SOV-lntemational Affairs, 19 January 1996, p. 18, cited by Rubinstein, p. 49. 
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make them, as Asian Russians, differentiated from the Russians of Russia. 100 Therefore, 
the Cossacks and their organizations in Kazakstan represent an absolutely different type 
of ethnic grouping. Claiming to be the descendants of the Cossacks, imperial Russian 
border troops, who played a vital role in conquering the Kazak lands, these 
organizations were formed in accordance with the para-military order of their 
'ancestors', retaining military ranks, namely ataman and hetman. Consisting exclusively 
of males, the Cossack groups have certain military attributes, such as uniform, shoulder 
straps, and swords. They incline for more extreme and radical means and have close 
relations with Pan-Russian Cossack movements, particularly with the Ural and Siberian 
Cossacks. 
There are three Cossack associations in Kazakstan: the Ural Union of Cossacks, led 
by hetman Aleksandr Kachalin (western Kazakstan), the Association for the Support of 
Semirechye Cossacks (hetman Nikolay Gyunkin, southern and central regions), and the 
Union of Cossacks of the Gorki line (hetman Viktor Achkasov, northern and eastern 
regions). 101 Vyacheslav Belokreniysky has argued that the great majority of the 
Cossacks were killed or fled out of the country during the Civil War and the first years 
of Bolshevik rule. Thus, the Cossack movement that emerged in Kazakstan in the 1990s 
"no doubt, has little to do with the true descendants of the Cossacks." 102 But still, the 
Cossacks represent a strong and well-organized movement, comprising the Slavness, 
Orthodox Christianity, and Russianness and have certain separatist inclinations due to 
their military order and system. Another feature that makes the Cossacks different from 
other Russian movements is that they have close ties with other Cossack groupings in 
Russia, especially the Siberian Cossack organizations, which instigate their extremist 
100 Roland Dannreuther, "Creating New States in Central Asia," Adelphi Paper 288 (March 1994), pp. 43-
44. 
101 Barsamov, pp. 305-306. 
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activities. 103 Russia is prone to consider Kazakstan as a 'steppe region' that puts it in a 
different place from the rest of Central Asia. The northern and eastern provinces of the 
republic, which are predominantly Russian populated , are envisaged as Southern 
Siberia, i.e. the extension of Siberia. Officially, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Aid signed in May 1992 between Russia and Kazakstan confirmed the 
inviolability of existing frontiers and the territorial integrity of Kazakstan and the 
participants undertook "to proscribe and terminate on their territory the formation and 
activities of groups and organizations, as well as of individuals, directed against the 
independence and territorial integrity of both states or toward the exacerbation of 
relations between nationalities, 11104 Moreover, president Yeltsin's statement has assured 
that Russia has no territorial claims on Kazakstan. 105 Nonetheless, Russian separatist 
movements, spurred and supported by some Russian organizations, especially those of 
Russian Cossacks, represent a real impending threat to Kazakstan's integrity. 
From the very beginning the Kazak government commited a restricted and 
suppressive policy toward the Cossacks. Most of the Cossack organizations were 
refused registration by the Ministry of Justice or were deliberately delayed for years. In 
March 1992, the Kazatskiye Novosti (Cossack News) and Gubemiya, two pro-Cossack 
publications were refused to be allowed to renew their registration (i.e. stopped 
existing) and were accused of "stirring up strife between nationalities" and 
"encroachment on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic." 106 
102 Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky, "Russia and Former Soviet Central Asia: The Attitude towards Regional 
Integrity," in Touraj Atabaki and John O'Kane (eds.), p. 56. 
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In 1994, there was a shallow easing in policy toward the Cossacks. In June, the 
Association for Support of the Cossacks of Semirechye, and in July, a Cossack 
Assistance Society were registered by the Ministry of Justice, while stressing that they 
had no rights to constitute a military grouping and were only to promote their historical 
traditions, feasts, and customs. 101 The 'persecution' of Cossack organizations, 
particularly, the arrests of Cossack leaders (V. I. Achkasov, N. V. Gunkin, V. V. 
Miheyev, and N. I. Shibanov) in Kazakstan has been severely criticized by Russian 
State Duma. 108 
The Cossacks, who have even presented themselves as the 'Serbs' of Kazakstan and 
who would "stand firm" 109 have been involved in a number separatist actions. One of 
the most recent and notorious ones happened on November 18, 1999, when some 22 
person were arrested in Oskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk) by Kazak authorities. The 
separatists, led by Viktor Kazimirchuk, a Russian citizen also known as Pugachev, 
"intended to seize the power in Eastern Kazakstan in order to establish the republic of 
'Russian Altay"' 110 by armed means. One June 8, 2000, Kazimirchuk was sentenced to a 
18 year imprisonment; other 13 members of the group were punished to imprisonments 
from 4 up to 17 years. 111 Even the request of Russia to ease the punishment and 
participation of the Russian embassy officials in the court sessions could not change the 
verdict. 
B. Kazak nation-building and Russian migration 
Since Kazakstan gained independence, one of the most important problems to be 
resolved became the problem of the Russians (not other minorities, although there are 
107 Bess Brown, "Kazakhstan Cossack Group Gains Official Recognition," RFEIRL Daily Report, No. 
127, 7 July 1994, pp. 2-3; cited by Petersen, p. 157; and Barsamov, p. 308. 
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some 100 nationalities within the republic's borders) and the issue of Kazak nation-
building. In fact, these problems were as important as national security or socio-
economic well-being, and were often intertwined. Many former Soviet states, 
particularly Central Asian republics, have committed national policies in favour of the 
titular ethnic group, but Kazakstan has certain peculiarities that made its national policy 
harder and more vulnerable: because of its divided ethnic composition, on the eve of 
independence the state could have just as easily become a 'Russian' as well. 
Just before independence and onwards, the republic has launched a gradual policy of 
Kazakization. At the first stage, this has never been reflected in the rhetoric of the 
president, who still seemed to adhere to the 'great' idea of post-Soviet integration. But as 
soon as the Kazaks become accustomed to their privileged status of a 'titular' nation and 
their national awareness increased, conducting a pro-Kazak policy became a sine qua 
non for political survival. The main aspects of Kazak nation-building are favouring the 
ethnic Kazaks socially and economically; the encouragement of the development of the 
Kazak language and Kazak traditional values, to the deliberate detriment of other ethnic 
groups, notably Russians; immigration of ethnic Kazaks from abroad; the tacit support, 
at least unofficially, for the emigration of non-Kazaks, and the building of a state 
structure mostly consisting of Kazaks. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet economy and the building of an incipient 
economy by means of privatization and the establishment of private enterprise, most of 
the key economic plants previously under the state-ownership passed to ethnic Kazaks. 
The enterprises largely fell under the direct control of the leaders of the Communist 
Party of Kazakstan, their relatives, and associates. During the process of economic 
transition in the republic, not only did family ties become important, but clanic-horde 
Ill Ibid. 
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kinship, which still occupies an important place in social relations gained increased 
significance. President Nazarbayev, his family, and even his Sapra$fl clan of the Kazak 
Ulu Juz (Elder Horde) became involved in the process of building a national 
bourgeoisie. One Russian newspaper has recently argued that Timur Kulebayev, the 
president of "KazTransOil" Company and son-in-law of Nazarbayev is certainly the 
richest man in the republic after Nazarbayev himself. 112 
Kazak clanic favouritism and nepotism has determined not only the economic life 
but also the social and political compound of state structure. In the first years after 
independence, some 80 % of Nazarbayev's administrative appointees, including regional 
governors, were ethnic Kazaks. 113 Most of the republic's key posts have gone to Kazaks, 
not even shallowly reflecting the ethnic composition of the state. The problem of Kazak 
nepotism became incessant complaint among ethnic Russians along with the problem of 
the Russian language and dual citizenship. According to 1994 statistics, the ratio 
between Kazaks and non-Kazaks (not only Russians) in the President's Office was 6:1; 
and in the Ministry of Economics, 7:1. 114 Even in northern and eastern regional 
administrations, which are predominantly Russian-populated, the ratio is only 4: 1. 115 
This disbalance is even more precipitous at the lower level of administration, and 
especially in the fields of culture and education. For example, the share of non-Kazaks 
in the ministry of Education dropped from 47 % in 1989 up to 20 % in 1992, i.e., the 
first year after independence. 116 The process of creating a Kazak economic and political 
elite has been launched throughout the country and in Russian-populated northern and 
eastern regions in particular. Moreover, "since the government still plays a large role in 
112 Denis Lomov, "Sekrety sem'yi Nazarbayeva: Kazakhstan pora pereimenovat' v Nazarbay-stan," 
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all spheres of life, including the organization of new commercial enterprises and 
ventures, ethnic criteria and an ethnic agenda for the state became important elements in 
the new economic life as well." 117 
In Russian media, especially after Putin, Nazarbayev is often accused of neglecting 
the specific problems of Kazakstani Russians and of "deliberately squeezing out of 
Kazakstan all inorodtsy and the building of a monoethnic state. "118 Another important 
problem of the Russian diaspora and naturally one of the key instruments of nation-
building (as a key means of Kazakization and elimination of the non-Kazaks from the 
state structure) is the Kazak language policy. The gradual penetration of the Kazak 
language in all spheres of life and its development eliminates the former privileged 
status of the Russians and the Russian language throughout the USSR. The Russians' 
lack of knowledge of Kazak, the official language of the RK, prevents the Russians' 
social and economic promotion and exacerbates their current 'second-class' position: 
participation in some professions is forbidden for those who do not know the state 
language. 119 According to the Kazak constitution, those who do not know Kazak can not 
serve in official posts after the year 2010, 120- again causing an even more rapid decline 
in the share of non-Kazak officials. The policy of Kazakization of the state language 
was also underpinned by the renaming of organizations and locations with their original 
Kazak names, or, many times, by providing a new Kazak name. In some cases when the 
original name was a Russian one -such as the names of fortresses- the official spelling 
became adjusted due Kazak pronunciation. But, "the protest among Kazaks is not 
116 A. Dokuchaeva, "Trevozhnye tendentsii v kazakhskoy etnopoliticheskoy situatsii," Russkiy 
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caused by the Russian language or Russian culture (rather there is an obvious 
sympathy), but by the former policy of Russification." 121 
The 'discrimination' of the Russian language has been severely criticized by 
Russian politicians and by Russian organizations in Kazakstan. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn 
once argued that the Kazak government allot a five-year period for the achievement of 
fluency in Kazak even in Russian-populated districts of Kazakstan. 122 Aman Tuleyev, 
an ethnic Kazak with a dubious religious and ethnic identity and the governor of the 
Kemerovo oblast of Russia, said that a massive exodus of Russians might begin if 
Kazakstan would insist on Kazak as the only state language. 123 The 1993 Kazak 
constitution granted Russian the status of a language of interethnic communication, 
which, in fact, did not have any legal meaning. 124 The new Kazak constitution adopted 
in 1995 recognized that "in state organizations and organs of local administration 
Russian would be used officially alongside with Kazak (Article 7/2)."125 Again, this was 
a symbolic concession and in practice was ignored many times. For instance, the 
Senate, one of two houses of the Kazak parliament, recently decided to perform all 
sessions only in Kazak, which was interpreted as a direct violation of the constitution. 126 
By another concession, the Kazak language and literature tests were deemed no longer 
obligatory for everyone taking the higher education entrance examination. 127 But again, 
according to the law "On Languages in the Republic of Kazakstan," teaching of Kazak 
as a state language became compulsory for every school in the republic, regardless of 
their main language of instruction and also the Kazak language test would become 
121 Burkut Ayaganov and Alibek Kuandykov, "Kazakhi v Kazakhstane," Aziya (Almaty), No. 24 (1993). 
122 Solzhenitsyn, p. 92. 
123 "Russia: Kazakhstan Warned of Possible Exodus by Russian Speakers," lnterfax, 13:58 GMT, 20 
November 1996; in FBIS-SOV-96-226. 
124 Barsamov, p. 326. 
125 A. Dokuchayeva, "Vse yazyki ravny, no kazakhsky- ravnee," Institut stran SNG, 22 May 2000; in IAC 
Eurasia, www.eurasia.org.ru. 
126 S. Petrov, "Russkiye v Kazakhstane glazami russkogo kazakhstantsa: Yesli eto ne genotsyd, to togda 
chto?" El. Pochta (IAC Eurasia), 15 June 2000. 
33 
compulsory for entry and graduation exams for secondary and higher education. 128 It is 
interesting that the establishment of a Russian and/or Slavic university -as was 
established in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan- was rejected by Kazak officials, while there 
are several American, Turkish and other international universities. On the question if, 
"Is there any need to protect the Russian language?" the mayor of Almaty, Viktor 
Khrapunov, said that "Obviously, no, because Russian is one of the official languages of 
the UN." 129 Another scrupulous problem of the Russian community in Kazakstan was 
that of dual citizenship (Russian and Kazakstani). If dual citizenship were implemented, 
Russia could have obtained the legal power to protect their rights and avoid the 
bureaucratic obstacles of integration. The request for dual citizenship was again rejected 
by Kazakstan, as was the case with all other Central Asian states, save Turkmenistan. 
After gaining independence in 1991, Kazakstan started to attract and support the 
ethnic Kazak immigration to Kazakstan from abroad. Some 4.5 million130 ethnic Kazaks 
live outside the republic and are spread among Afghanistan, Mongolia, China, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. The repatriation of Kazaks living abroad has 
been regarded as a vital policy for the improvement of demographic disbalance in the 
country. The government allotted special funds, provided housing and employment, 
and, for Kazaks from Mongolia even provided transportation of livestock. 131 Between 
1991 and 1996, officially 154,941 ethnic Kazaks immigrated to Kazakstan: 84,828 (or 
55 %) coming from Russia; 65,126 (40 %) from Mongolia; 4,617 from Iran; and the 
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remainder from China, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 132 According to the Migration and 
Demographic Agency of Kazakstan, from 1992 to January 1, 1998, about 39,500 
families, or 170,000 ethnic Kazaks moved from abroad. 133 The leader of the Slavic 
movement LAD, Aleksandra Dokuchayeva, stated that the Kazak officials desperately 
kept secret the real migration statistics, both incoming and outgoing, 134 implying that 
the government figures for the number of out-going Russians was lower than actual 
number. Government support for newcoming Kazaks and the special assistance 
provided to them was criticized by the Russian community of Kazakstan who was 
displeased by their current social status. Along with privileged status in obtaining Kazak 
citizenship, the Kazaks from abroad have a right to dual citizenship that caused severe 
discontent by Kazakstani Russians, who were refused dual Kazak-Russian citizenship. 
According to the 1992 Law on State Independence of the Republic of Kazakstan, "all 
Kazakhs who were forced to leave the territory of the Republic and reside in other states 
have the right to Kazakstani citizenship at the same time as citizenship of other 
states." 135 The immigration law of the republic favouring ethnic Kazaks was also 
criticized by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Peter van Knieker. 136 
The repatriated Kazaks, and especially those from non-USSR countries, like China, 
Mongolia, and Turkey, are more strongly bound to the Kazak language and tradition, 
are understood to be more nationalistic than those living in Kazakstan. As means of 
Kazak nation-building and in order to improve the overpopulation of Russians in 
northern districs, the newly repatriated Kazak families were distributed among northern 
and eastern provinces, as well as to big cities with large Russian population. 
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Interestingly, no Kazak family from Mongolia was settled in Chimkent, one of the most 
Kazak-populated cities. 
In addition to the ethnic Kazak immigration policy, the Kazak government launched 
mew policies to improve the ethnic favouritism. The 1995 Constitution of the Republic 
of Kazakstan allows the heads of local administration to be appointed by the president, 
not 'allowing' Russians to get the majority in the Russian-predominated northern region. 
Also, regions (oblasts) were reshaped so that Russian-predominated regions were bound 
to one or two Kazak-predominated regions, thus making Russians impotent in elections. 
For example, the Russian populated former capital Almaty was incorporated with the 
Kazak populated Tald1-Korgan into the Almaty oblast. The most radical change the 
demographic distribution was the decision to move the capital from Almaty to Akmola, 
which was renamed later to Astana. As Denis Lomov has argued, the idea of moving the 
capital intended to "obstruct the legitimate reunification of Russian South Siberia with 
Russia." 137 Of course, there were several practical reasons in moving the capital 
northward: the northern capital is closer to the industrial and resource-rich regions of 
the republic; it is farther from China and the terrain of conflicts, such as Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan;138 it also makes the transportation routes between the center and 
periphery shorter and more efficient. But the most important outcome of the decision 
was its improvement of the ethnic disbalance in the north of the country. After 
becoming the capital, a small city Akmola, attracted a great number of migrants, mostly 
from the Kazak-populated south. In addition to the state administration -ministries, 
governmental organizations, parliament, state banks, all with their personnel and their 
families- the project of reconstruction of the new capital, worth nearly $10 billion, 139 
136 Barsamov, pp. 307-308. 
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created great economic opportunities, again involving ethnic Kazaks from the south. By 
1997, about $1 billion had already been spent for the new capital. 140 Nazarbayev stated 
"The youth and new generations of Kazakhs will appreciate the necessity of moving the 
capital from Almaty to Akmola for the development of the country." 141 
The governmental policy of attracting Kazaks living outside the republic became a 
secondary concern with a great out-migration of non-Kazaks, especially Russians, 
starting in the 1990s. 142 By January 1, 1998, some 2.2 million people had left the 
country, 1.2 million of whom had migrated to Russia. 143 Although the republic's 
population had decreased by 940,000 and dropped to 15.6 millions, 144 the share of 
ethnic Kazaks considerably increased since independence. Even without the great 
emigration of non-Kazaks and the immigration of ethnic Kazaks from abroad, the 
Kazak natural birth-rate and the number of children in a family is sizeably higher among 
Kazaks: more than 80 % of all teenagers are Kazaks. 145 It is obvious for Kazaks that 
"time and demography are ultimately on their side." 146 Irina Zviagelskaia asserts, that 
The migration of Russians from the republics of Central Asia was to a considerable extent a natural 
event. ... Accustomed to being under the patronage of the state, they showed a low degree of political 
organization and social solidarity and therefore felt defenceless in the new, unexpectedly foreign 
countries. 147 
Most of the Russians leaving the republic were skilled industrial personnel. Their 
immigration to Russia did not cause any social or economic discontent, especially in 
scarcely populated regions of the Russian Federation. But the presence of Russians in 
Kazakstan could provide Russia with leverage to influence the republic's policy. 
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Therefore, Russia has to be concerned with the protection of civil rights of local 
Russians to encourage them stay. 148 
On the other hand, the growing Kazak sentiment bolstered by the incipient Kazak 
economic elite, forces Nazarbayev to conduct a policy favouring the Kazaks. Olcott 
argues that "Nazarbayev's policy is especially delicate because Kazakstan's large 
Russian population requires him to portray the republic as a secular, multinational entity 
rather than as a Central Asian one of Turkic and Muslim pedigree." 149 But today he 
himself is 'obliged' to pronounce the national and religious facet of the nation in order to 
prevent the rise of any nationalistic or religious parties. Also, Kazakstani Russians are 
aware of the fact that "any successor of Nazarbayev is likely to be more 'Kazakh', and 
thus less sympathetic to their concerns. "150 Therefore, the position of Nazarbayev is far 
to become delicate, even because of Russians. Even some of the Cossack organizations, 
the most extreme para-military Russian groupings in Kazakstan, agreed on the idea of 
emigration to Russia. For example, the Ataman of the Semirechye Cossack Union, 
Vladimir Ovsyannikov, asserted that some 150,000 Cossacks wished to leave for 
Russia. 151 As a response to criticism, Nazarbayev stated that there was no such 'Russian 
problem' in Kazakstan; Russians were leaving solely by their own will- for their 
historical motherland or in search of higher wages- and not because they were 
displeased with the policy of the Kazak government. 152 As one analyst has argued the 
government-controlled media in Kazakstan deliberately denigrates the situation in 
Russia, while concealing socio-economic problems of their own by strict censorship. 153 
Therefore, the created "ethnicity, which formed a statehood, but did not have any 
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149 Martha Brill Olcott, "Kazakhstan," in Mesbahi (ed.), Central Asia and the Caucasus, p. 138. 
150 Olcott, "Post-Soviet Kazakhstan." 
151 "Cossacks View Repatriation Differently," lnterfax, 14:57 GMf, 10 August 1999; in FBIS-SOV-1999-
0810. 
38 
national interests within its framework," 154 is likely to become gradually a real 'Kazak' 
state. 
3. Kazakstan and regions of Russia 
Kazakstan's relations with the regions of the Russian Federation are mostly based on 
economic matters. After the collapse of the USSR and the de facto disruption of inter-
Soviet economic ties which hampered Kazakstani industry, it was necessary to revive 
former economic linkages to make Kazak industrial plants function again. It was even 
more vital for the north of Kazakstan, whose industry was deeply dependent on that of 
Southern Siberia of Russia. Another important question was the legal and economic 
facilities provided for Kazakstani Russian emigrants, a great number of whom moved to 
Russian regions neighbouring Kazakstan. 
As a delicate mode of its foreign policy, Kazakstan emphasized only the economic 
aspects of relations. As a rule the Kazak government did not focus on the ethnic or 
religious features of a region or an autonomous republic and Kazakstan always shows 
its inevitable respect to Russia's territorial integrity. As Laumulin notes, the possible 
disintegration of the Russian Federation and instability caused by it would directly 
affect the situation in northern Kazakstan and make the Russian security guarantees on 
Kazakstan dubious. 155 
Initially, the Kazak government was anxious about the strengthening of relations 
with Russian regions, especially ethnically Russian neighbouring ones, for fear of 
separatism in Kazakstan. In January 1993, Leonid Polezhayev, the governor of Omsk, 
the biggest Russian city close to Kazak border, organized a bilateral meeting of Russian 
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and Kazak regional heads, which he called "integration from below." 156 But the 
incipient attempts for regional integration was resisted by Kazakstan following the 
involvement of Siberian Cossacks located in Omsk in separatist movements in 
Kazakstan. In early February 1995, an agreement on cooperation of the border oblasts 
of Russia and Kazakstan was signed in Omsk. 157 The agreement intended integration in 
the field of economics not only with the Omsk region, but comprises nine northern 
oblasts of Kazakstan, the Altay Republic, Altay Kray, and ten oblasts of Russia. One of 
the most important issues regulated by the agreement was the "simplification of the 
rules of migration for the inhabitants of above mentioned oblasts and a 'simplified 
procedure for acquiring citizenship by citizens of the Russian Federation who have 
come for permanent residence to Kazakstan, and by citizens of Kazakstan who have 
come to permanent residence to Russia'." 158 The agreement has important meaning in 
solving the several legal and economic obstacles for ethnic Russian emigrants, by 
facilitating emigration to Russia. 
The Republic of Kazakstan also supports relations with the republics of the Russian 
Federation. Using their 'right' to establish limited external relations, 'diplomatic' 
representatives from the republics of the Russian Federation, such as the republics of 
Tatarstan and Sakha (Y akutia), opened diplomatic missions in Kazakstan. Among the 
republics of the Russian Federation, Tatarstan enjoys a special place for Kazakstan both 
due to the close ethnic and linguistic kinship between the Kazaks and Volga Tatars and 
because of the highly-industrialized economy of Tatarstan, especially its oil-refineries 
and machine-building sectors. An agreement signed on August 25, 1997, intended to 
expand bilateral trade and economic cooperation, which by that time amounted to $60 
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million annually. 159 During the official inauguration of Astana, Tatar President Mintimir 
Shaymiyev was received alongside with other presidents of the CIS countries. 
4. Current trends in Russo-Kazak relations 
A. From the CIS to the 'Eurasian Union' 
In March 1994, president Nazarbayev proposed the establishment of the so-called 
'Eurasian Union'-yevraziyskiy soyuz- upon the inability of the CIS to revive as a stable 
base of integration. Nazarbayev had presented his 'brilliant idea' everywhere and with 
every possible occasion. Nazarbayev presented his idea of the Eurasian Union 
everywhere, so if the idea succeeded it might make him the Jean Monet of Eurasia. 
The new union was to include free trade and common economic institutions, but the 
most important aspect was a common citizenship. 160 Nazarbayev inaugurated the idea of 
the Eurasian Union in his speech to the academic staff of the Moscow State University 
on March 29, 1994.161 The kernel of the Eurasian Union Treaty would be the 
establishment of the supranational organs obliged to coordinate economic, defence, and 
foreign policy of the former Soviet states though establishment of the Council of State 
Heads and Government, the Council of Defence Ministers, and the Council of Foreign 
Ministers. 162 Another aspect of the new Union that made it different from the CIS would 
be direct election for Common Parliament to coordinate legislative action of the 
member states of the prospective Union. 163 In September 1994, Kazakstan organized 
and hosted an international conference on "the Eurasian Space: Using Integration 
158 Ibid. 
159 "Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan and Tatarstan to Expand Trade, Economic Cooperation," lnterfax, 14:26, 25 
August 1997; in FBIS-SOV-97-237. 
160 Liz Fuller, RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 57, 23 March 1994; and Ben Brown, RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 
201, 21 October 1994; both cited by Henry Hale, "Commentary on Kazakhstan," in Alexei Arbatov et al. 
(eds.), p. 338. 
161 Tokayev, p. 87. 
162 Ibid., p. 88. 
163 Ibid. 
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Potential," following which President Nazarbayev sent a draft proposal on the Eurasian 
Union to all leaders of the CIS.164 
Nazarbayev pointed out that the 17 agreements signed in Moscow January 20, 1995, 
comprising certain issues on military and economic cooperation, citizenship, and a 
customs union, were the first evidence that "the Eurasian Union has now started being 
implemented in practice." 165 But the eagerness and endeavour of Nazarbayev to create 
the Eurasian Union was not welcomed by most of the CIS countries and was even 
regarded as a genius trick of astute Kazak diplomacy. First and foremost, the new idea 
could return Nazarbayev to his former prestige and respectability. It had been argued 
that by proposing the idea of a new union, he intended to buy some extra time to keep 
stability in the republic. 166 According to Barsamov, the proposal intended to gain 
support for Nazarbayev from the republic's Russian population; i.e., it had a domestic 
policy meaning. 167 Another argument considering Kazak intention says that a union 
involving common citizenship could easily avoid the problem of dual citizenship 
proposed by Kazakstani Russians and could enable Nazarbayev to "confront the internal 
problem of the non-Kazaks in his country by blaming Russia for hesitating to 
integrate." 168 
In fact, it is really hard to imagine that the skilful diplomat and politician 
Nazarbayev had been sincerely hopeful that the Eurasian Union would come into being, 
at a time when it was obvious that even a weaker union as the CIS was far from 
reaching its goals and in the edge of collapse. The Eurasian Union certainly provided 
extra time for Nazarbayev to create a national state while he helped to avoid serious 
164 "Nazarbayev Views Eurasian Union at Conference," /TAR-TASS, 15:51GMT,19 September 1994; in 
FBIS-SOV-94-182; and Belokrenitsky, p. 56. 
165 FF 0193- B-WIRE, 23:31:36, 20 January 1995. 
166 Hale, p. 338. 
167 Barsamov, p.321. 
168 Belokrenitsky, p. 57. 
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damage either in foreign or domestic policy, and further providing a basis for any kind 
of regional rapprochement on his own terms. It is interesting that later in 1997 he stated 
that the most vital issue was the "real integration among member countries of the 
Commonwealth, Russia, China, and the entire Eurasian continent" (emphasis added),169 
thus for the first time meaning an integration that did not correspond to the former 
Soviet territories. In his recent interview to Nezavisimaya gazeta, Nazarbayev said that 
he still adhered to his ideas about the EAU and that he meant integration resembling to 
that of the European Union. 170 
B. Russian-Belarus Union and Kazakstan 
Another development in post-Soviet Space that directly influenced the CIS was the 
declaration of a union state between Russia and Belarus, which deprived Nazarbayev of 
the title as the greatest integrator and sizeably changed his political inclination. The idea 
of a union state emerged with the election of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, formerly a 
parliamentary deputy, the president of Belarus since July 1994. 171 Following his coming 
to power, Lukashenka started to widen his power by suppressing and eliminating his 
opponents. He started he to realize his great aspirations of the union of the republic of 
Belarus and the Russian Federation. Therefore, within a short period he created a real 
dictatorship as a way to maintain his notorious claims. By a constitutional referendum 
held on November 25, 1996,172 Lukashenka created a legitimate base for his absolute 
autocracy and the establishment of a union state with Russia. 
The establishment of a union state also seemed to provide certain advantages for 
Russia, such as the free usage of Belarussian military sites, its early warning radar 
169 "Kazakhstan: Government for Comprehensive Integration With Russia," /TAR-TASS, 20:08 GMT, 24 
April 1997; in FBIS-SOV-97-114. 
170 "Nursultan Nazarbayev: My za mnogopolyusnyi mir," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 February 2000. 
171 "Alyaksandr Lukashenka: Europe's Odd Man Out," Economist, 25 July 98, Vol. 348, Issue 8078, p. 51. 
172 Peter Ford, "The World's Latest Pariah: Belarus Moves to One-Man Rule After Vote," Christian 
Science Monitor, 28 November 1996, Vol. 89, Issue 2; in EBSCOhost. 
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systems, and its military factories, which directly affect Russia's security. Also, Russia 
gained an absolute ally in international organizations and a buffer zone against the 
NATO expansion eastward. Thereby, the idea of a union state was wholeheartedly 
supported by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR), while most Russian democrats remained cool to the idea. But when the 
Communists and pro-Sovietists, led by Gennadiy Zyuganov, emerged as a primary 
challenge to Yeltsin's rule, the latter supported the idea in order to gain the favour of 
USSR-nostalgists. The integration process was mostly based on economic and military 
matters and many agreements had been signed, including one for cancelling mutual 
debts, but still most of treaties, especially on economic issues, remained on paper and 
had not been implemented. 
The Kazak government and President Nazarbayev, formerly the 'number one' 
supporter and initiator of any kind of integration among the former-USSR states, did not 
propose the idea of joining the Russian-Belarus Union, as it happened in December 
1991. However, some pro-Russian movements in Kazakstan widely supported the idea 
of unification and even proposed a referendum on the matter. Nazarbayev, in an 
interview to a Russian newspaper, commented on the matter: 
Unification of states in an union state or any other form is the business of these states and peoples. 
And it should be concerned with understanding and respect to their choice .... But if it is to turn into 
some kind of return to the former-USSR, then it is inadmissible for the CIS countries .... Today, for 
Kazakstan the matter of joing the union is out of agenda anyway. We suggest that our current alliance 
level of relations with Russia and Belarus within the framework of the Customs Union is adequate 
for our national interests and objective conditions of the historical moment. 173 
While the two countries were involved in a unification process, other CIS countries, 
and Kazakstan particularly, were concerned with their own economies seeking external 
financial aid and cooperation, especially after the 'August 17' financial crisis in Russia 
and its inability to afford the financial burden of the unification with Belarus. Along 
173 "Nursultan Nazarbayev: My za mnogopolyusnyi mir." 
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with the economic dimension, two other important reasons kept Kazakstan out of the 
union. First, the anti-Western policy launched by Lukashenka caused the deprivation of 
Western aid to Belarus and making it a 'rogue state'. Therefore, establishing close 
relations with Belarus, not to mention unification, might make Kazakstan an 
unfavourable state for the West, since the country had already a bad image due to its 
human rights violations and anti-democratic sanctions. Second, the Slavic emphasis of 
the union, which became even stronger by the 'admission' of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to the union, not only deflated non-Slavic states of the CIS, but also 
disillusioned non-Russian republics of the Russian Fedaration; Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan also condemned the pro-Serb policy of Russia during the Kosovo crisis. 
Mintimir Shaymiyev, the president of Tatarstan, stated that in the case of the creation of 
a union state his republic would insist on the same status as Belarus. 174 
The union state of Belarus and Russia officially created by the Union Treaty, signed 
by both presidents in December 1999, made the CIS unfunctional. Seeing that the two 
countries, closest ethnically and linguistically and most willing to unification could not 
really implement their agreements and make any practical progress, the CIS countries 
became disappointed in the possibility of integration among the CIS countries and in 
Russia's real potential. Meanwhile, the growing national consciousness and acclimation 
to their independence distanced the states, as was seen during the Kosovo crisis, when 
none of the newly independent states, ~xcept Kirghizstan, audibly protested against 
NATO operations. 
C. Russian foreign policy after the Chechnia crisis 
174 Mikhail Portnikov, "A Year of the Soviet Union," Kiev Zerkalo Nedeli, 11 January 99; in FBIS-SOV-
99-013. 
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After the 'Eurasianists', arguing that "Russia's natural and traditional allies were in 
the South rather than in the West," 175 started to form Russian foreign policy (especially 
after Yevgeniy Primakov became the foreign minister and later the Prime Minister), it 
was expected that Russia would increase its imperial claims over Kazak:stan and would 
support separatism in the north of the republic. But the Chechen crisis emerged as the 
declaration of the independence of Chechia under the leadership of Dudayev (who lived 
for a long period in Kazakstan after his family was deported in 1944) could not be 
turned down and later turned into a full-fledged war. The wide-spread rhetoric of the 
Russian commanding staff about the purging of the Chechen territories from 'a couple 
of terrorist bunches' had caused a humiliating defeat of the Russian army and the 
signing of a truce in 1996 at Hasavyurt. Heavy casualties of the Russian army and 
enormous financial spending caused despair among Russian politicians and seriously 
damaged the former image of the great military power of Russia. In addition, Chechnia, 
there are other Muslim-populated republics of the Russian Federation, some of which 
reached a high level of economic development. The most important 'card' the Chechen 
leadership relied on was Islam. Any further armed conflict between Russia and its 
Muslim subjects would certainly be supported by Chechens. For Russia, it would be 
even more unaffordable to launch another war within the borders of the Russian 
Federation, not to mention one with the Central Asian republics, which have larger 
population, national armies, and direct or transitional borders with other Muslim states, 
such as Iran and Afghanistan. 
Since the 'first' Chechen war Russia seemed assert the principles of 'indivisibility of 
borders' and 'territorial integrity' as the corner-stone of its domestic and foreign policy 
(which naturally includes marking terrorism, radical Islam, and separatism as the arch 
175 Amin Saikal, "Russia and Central Asia," in Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds.), p. 143. 
46 
enemies of the statehood). In the same mood, Russia refrained from audible support of 
ethnic Russian separatism in northern Kazakstan and from threats of using military 
power 'if needed', this time emphasizing human rights violations and language rights. 
As Ronald Dannreuther has stated, Russia would support amicable Kazak-Russian 
relations and avoid serious tensions since "increased hostility could act as a catalyst for 
a deterioration of Russian relations with the Turkic Central Asian peoples, many of 
whom live within the borders of the Russian Federation." 176 
Upon the outburst of the 'second' Chechen war, President Nazarbayev condemned 
separatism and terrorism and stated that "the events taking place within Russia's 
sovereign territory should be regarded as Russia's internal affair," 177 while also stating 
that both sides, the Chechen Republic and the Russian Federation, did not implement 
the 1996 agreement. In 1996, the Chechen government preferred Nazarbayev to 
Shaymiyev and Ruslan Khasbulatov as the mediator at the peace talks, 178 despite his 
reaffirmation that the crisis was Russia's internal matter. 
While the Kazak leadership in their official speeches backed Russian operation in 
Chechnia, there is increasing information of the Kazak involvement in the crisis on the 
side of the Chechens. The press center of the United Group of Troops had reported 
about the existence of a Kazak battalion fighting on the Chechen side. 179 Recently, Maj. 
General Vyacheslav Borisov, deputy commander of the Russian combined federal 
forces in the North Caucasus, stated that some 300 Chechen militants involved in 
176 Dannreuther, pp.44-45. 
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combat actions are currently receiving medical treatment at a sanatorium in the Eastern-
Kazakstan region. 180 
Since the 'first' Chechen war and the signing of the truce, which postponed the 
consideration of the republic's final status, Chechnia, in fact, became the genuine 'near 
abroad'. Since both Russia and the newly independent peoples started to become 
accustomed to their independence, Russia seems that it abandoned the notion of the so-
called 'near abroad' or at least the term has become pronounced more seldomly in 
official statements. Anatoliy Adamishin, formerly the minister of the CIS affairs, 
recently stated that "the CIS countries are as independent as others and relations with 
them should be built while really and critically evaluating their policy. Finally, Finland 
and the USA (there is a 16 km-long distance between Alaska and Russia) are no less 
'near abroad' than Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan." 181 Relations between Russia and 
Kazakstan seem to have quit the former role of 'mighty elder brother- younger brother' 
while Kazakstan is getting accustomed to its independence. Recently, the Kazak 
parliament rejected the agreement on the usage of military test-sites on the territory of 
Kazakstan by Russia. In the meantime, the Kazak border troops seized confiscated the 
Russian ships that fished in the Kazak sector of the Caspian Sea. Also, the Kazak 
government claimed possession of the Khvalynskoe oil-deposits which was recently 
exploited by the Russian LUK-Oil. 182 After neighbouring Kirghizstan's parliament gave 
the Russian language the status of official language alongside with Kirghiz (where 
Russians constitute only 13 % of the population), the same gesture was expected from 
the Kazak leadership, but the latter refused even to consider the matter. During his first 
180 "Kazakh Official Denies Chechen Rebel Receiving Medical Treatment in Kazakhstan," lntetfax, 10:12 
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official visit to Moscow after Putin officially became president in March 2000, 
Nazarbayev proposed to create a special Fund for the Protection of the Russian 
language in Former Soviet Space, which was accepted by Vladimir Putin. 183 But still it 
would be only a 'fund' comprising the whole 'former Soviet space' and would have no 
binding or legal instructions. Another important step toward real independence was the 
Kazak withdrawal from the CIS Visa agreement starting from February 1, 2000 which 
stipulated that "citizens holding the passports of other CIS member countries will need 
Kazakh visas for transit via Kazakstan." 184 
Since Putin came to power in Russia, the Ministry of the CIS Affairs has been 
dissolved and a department within the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs was charged with 
dealing with the matter. While not everything has changed, economic matters are gaining 
primary importance in bilateral relations. Today Russian mass media often mentions 
Kazak dependency on Russian oil-pipelines as a bargaining chip for the improvement of 
the Russians' rights in the republic. It has become now it is really unusual to hear any 
proposal for Russian military pressure on Kazakstan- save some Western authors -as was 
often spoken previously. Recently, an interesting proposal was mentioned in a Russian 
newspaper on the solving of the problem of Russians living in Kazakstan: the author 
offered to sell the disputed Kuril Islands to Japan and proposed to buy a part of northern 
Kazakstan instead. 185 
183 Kazakh News, 21 June 2000. 
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CHAPTER II: KAZAKSTAN AND REGIONAL STATES 
1. Kazakstan and Central Asia 
A. Kazak- Uzbek relations 
a. Struggle for Central Asian leadership 
Throughout the Soviet history Kazakstan has been regarded as a geographical and 
historical extension of Southern Siberia. While the rest of Central Asia was named 
Srednyaya aziya (Middle Asia), the term Srednyaya aziya i Kazakhstan (Middle Asia 
and Kazakstan) became used to denote the whole Soviet Central Asia. Historically, the 
area that is now Kazakstan fell under the Tsarist rule about a century earlier than so-
called Middle Asia and started to be integrated into. the imperial economy and 
administration. The Kazak Khanate was established by Janibek and Geray Khans, two 
sons of Barak Khan, in the second half of the 15th century and encompassed the seceded 
tribes and families which formerly belonged to the state of Nomadic Uzbeks under 
Abulhayr Khan (the grandfather of Shaybani Khan, the founder of the Shaybanide 
state), when the state of Abulkhayr was severely weakened by the invasion of Jungars. 
From the mid-151h century until the beginning of the 17th century, the Kazak 
Khanate was a unified political entity. In the 1 ih century the khanate broke up and was 
divided into several separate khanates. According to Muhammed Haydat Dughlat, the 
Kazak Khanate was founded in Hijra 870 ( 1465-1466), and the number of Kazaks under 
the rule of Janibek and Geray reached 200,000 in 1468.186 From its establishment until 
its elimination, the Kazak Khanate was a rival to the Khiva and Khokand khanates, 
remnants of the Uzbek state, committing several wars against them causing many 
territories passed from one side to another. 
186 Mirza Haydar Dughlat, Tarikh-i-Rashidi: A History of the Hans of Moghulistan, Sources of Oriental 
Languages and Literatures: 38, Massachussetts, 1996, p. 154, cited by Meryem Kirimli, The Genesis of 
Kazak Nationalism and Independent Kazakstan: a History of Native Reactions to Russian-Soviet Policies, 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Bilkent University, Ankara, 1999, p.26. 
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The Central Asian republics have lots of things in common: common history and 
ties, common problems of independent state-building, and a perceived common threat 
of Russia. At the beginning of their 'independent career' they operated harmoniously 
within the CIS by coordinating their actions. With the consolidation of their state 
independence and the all-powerful local leaderships, however, the harmony among the 
Central Asian republics turned into harsh rivalries, although their official rhetoric of 
'eternal brotherhood' was not lost. The Central Asian republics might still use any 
possibility to hamper the other Central Asian states' promotion, but there are certain 
vulnerabilities that still force them to cooperate: their political opposition (it is 
impossible to hear any criticism about the lack of democracy from any leader of these 
states about the other), radical Islam, drug trafficking, and, of course, the Russian 
threat- though the priorities for every state are different. All these states are still 
dependent on Russia, either politically or economically or both, and they are in a severe 
competition for Russian and Western aid and investment. 
Among the five Central Asian states, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are the most 
influential ones with regard to their populations, economic and military power, 
demographic compound, and geography. The population of each of the two states is 
greater than that of the rest of Central Asia. By July 1995, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan 
had populations of 17.4 and 23.1 million respectively and their GDP amounted to 55.2 
and 54.5 billion dollars, and their armed forces had 40,000 and 25,000 of manpower. 187 
Another feature that made Uzbekistan very influential in the region was its demographic 
structure: it has a relatively homogeneous population where Uzbeks represent more than 
75% 188 of the whole population, as well as considerable Uzbek minorities in all other 
187 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency I995; and International Institute of Strategic Studies 1995; both cited 
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Central Asian republics. Under these circumstances, the two countries compete for 
leadership in the region, where Kazakstan initiated of regional cooperation and 
integration as a means to counterbalance its vulnerability vis-a-vis Russia. Kirghizstan, 
with its large Uzbek minority and several zones of dispute, tried to counterbalance the 
Uzbek threat under an umbrella comprising the whole region. Turkmenistan, with its 
small population and rich natural resources, tried to avoid any kind of integration in 
order not to fall under Uzbek or Kazak influence. The struggle among these two 
countries also formed the two leaders, presidents Nazarbayev and Karimov: whereas the 
former became the innovator of any ideas of cooperation, the latter consistently rejected 
them. 189 For the most part, Kazakstan's initiatives to create a 'Central Asian Union' was 
a response to Russian endeavours in Belarus and Ukraine. In addition, Kazakstan's 
cooperation with the Central Asian states had been its first experience of 'external' 
cooperation without Russian supervision. 
The first meeting of the Central Asian leaders took place in Almaty on June 23, 
1990, when then the First Secretary of the Kazak Communist Party, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, invited the Communist leaders of the Central Asian republics: Niyazov of 
Turkmenistan, Mahkamov of Tajikistan, Karimov of Uzbekistan, and Masaliyev of 
Kyrgyzstan. 19° Following the collapse of the USSR, the newly independent regional 
states increased cooperation attempts, such as in December 1991 in a response to the 
Slavic Union. At a June 1990 summit, regional councils met to solve common problems 
of cultural, scientific, and environmental matters, which formed the first serious stage of 
institutionalizing regional cooperation. Another meeting of the Central Asian leaders 
was held in Ashkabad, on December 12, 1991.191 The participation of Azerbaijan gave 
189 Hunter, p. 93. 
19° Kazakhstanslwya pravda, 25 June 1990; cited by Olcott, CANS, p. 52. 
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the meeting a Turkic-Muslim atmosphere, but the ongoing war with Armenia hampered 
the latter's cooperation with Central Asia. 
One of the most important meetings among the regional powers was held in early 
January 1993 in Tashkent, where the term Tsentral'naya aziya (Central Asia) was 
formally adopted to name the Central Asian states including Kazakstan, instead of 
Srednyaya aziya i Kazakhstan (Middle Asia and Kazakstan). 192 One of the most 
important conclusions of the meeting was the creation of a common market and a plan 
to coordinate economic policies. 193 The next stage of regional cooperation was launched 
mainly by Kazakstan and Uzbekistan with Kyrgyzstan's indispensable participation in 
every project. Turkmenistan followed its policy of 'neutralism' and Tajikistan ran into a 
civil war with Russia's instigation and support. In January 1994, the presidents of 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan signed bilateral agreements on the creation of a common 
market, the abolishment of customs check-points, and free border crossing for their 
citizens. 194 Later that year Kyrgyzstan also joined the 'Kazak-Uzbek Union' and the 
trilateral agreement was signed on April 30, 1994.195 During the Almaty summit held on 
June 8, 1994, the three countries established an Interstate Council, an Executive 
Committee and founded the Council of Prime Ministers, the Council of Foreign 
Ministers, and the Council of Defence Ministers. 196 On July 8, 1994, the participants 
established the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development facilitating 
interstate fiscal transactions. But in reality, most of these gestures of ardent friendship 
and cooperation simply remained on paper and the two republics followed independent 
pathes: Uzbekistan was more concerned with its domestic 'Islamist' opposition and 
192 Belokrenitsky, p. 51; and Olcott, CANS, p. 55. 
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actively 'participated' in the Tajik-Afghan cns1s, while Kazakstan continued its 
'integrationist' policy and nation-building process. Not surprisingly, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan did not participate in Nazarbayev's conference on Eurasian Union 
organized in Almaty. 197 Also, the Uzbek side hesitated with regard to the idea of Central 
Asian trilateral integration after the marriage of Nazarbayev's youngest daughter and 
Akayev's son. 
b. Long-lasting tradition: the border issue 
One of the most vulnerable issues between the Central Asian states is that of their 
borders. This issue can be considered a legacy of the Soviet period, which created them 
artificially with no regard to prevalent ethnic, geographical, or economic conditions. In 
addition to these borders, some purely artificial ethnicities had been created, such as the 
Karakalpaks, whose titular land was initially a part of the Kazak ASSR. It later was 
transferred to the RSFSR, and had finally been incorporated into Uzbekistan as the 
Karakalpak ASSR in 1936. The border disputes between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan had 
been exacerbated by their status during Soviet times: the borders were simply the 
domestic administrative lines between the two Soviet republics and were prone to be 
changed, since none were demarcated nor delineated. 
On June 24,1992, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Mutual Assistance. The treaty guarantees the principle of non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs and does "recognize and respect territorial integrity and 
inviolability of existing borders between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, and denounce any 
kind of encroachment on these borders. Any establishment and change of the state 
197 "Nazarbayev: Eurasian Union Meets CIS Interests," lnterfax, 16:36 GMT, 20 Sep 1994; in FBIS-SOV-
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border regime would be embodied on mutual agreement." 198 The approximate length of 
the Kazak-Uzbek border is 230 km. 199 
For the last few years, incidents occurred in the border zone have increased and 
became more violent. The two countries started to increase the number of military 
troops in this 'friendly zone' increase in drug smuggling and illegal immigration. Only in 
one month -January 2000- several armed clashes occurred between the border guards of 
the two countries, sometimes involving local populations, especially in the disputed 
zone that comprises an area of more than 15,000 hectares.200 
On January 25, 2000, Uzbek border guards in their armoured personnel carrier 
penetrated the Kazak territories for 50 km and started to mark out a line of 60 km 
long201 (according to Nezavisimaya gazeta, they advanced 50 km and delineated a zone 
of about 22,000 hectares).202 The Kazak government, in a diplomatic note sent to 
Tashkent, denoted the occasion as an "invasion of the territory of a sovereign state"203 
and the Kazak Foreign Minister Erlan Idrisov stated that Kazakstan "will not give up an 
inch of land." 204 The Kazak side had started its troop positioning in September 1999. 205 
Until that time, it was an unguarded zone. Following the incident, both sides started 
negotiations on the demarcation of the border while both parties continued to increase 
the number of the border troops and facilities. Upon the note of protest from the Kazak 
side, the Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated that "there are not and will 
not be any territorial tension between Uzbekistan and Kazakstan .... The subject of 
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border disputes between Uzbekistan and Kazakstan is being 'artificially puffed up' these 
days, while the issue involves only delimitation and demarcation of the border between 
the two countries. "206 The border incident that stirred up a diplomatic clash within a 
couple of days settled down through actual negotiations by bilateral working groups, 
starting the process of demarcation. According to the Kazak Foreign Minister, by June 
2000, 40 km of borderline had already been demarcated.207 In July 2000, Kazakstan 
started negotiations on the delimitation and demarcation of the state border with the 
Republic of Kyrgyzstan.208 Thus, Kazakstan started to fulfil one of the most important 
requirements of an independent state- real and admitted borders. Interestingly, the 
nationalist Kazak parties, such as Alash and Azat, which use any possible excuse to 
criticize and picket the Russian embassy in conflicts involving Russia, did not forward 
their protests to the Uzbek side after the border accident.209 
c. Kazakstan and the Kazaks in Uzbekistan 
Another specific feature that makes Kazak- Uzbek relations tense and which 
exacerbates adequate solution of the border problem is the issue of minorities: the 
Kazak minority in Uzbekistan and the Uzbek minority in Kazakstan. As a result of 
Soviet state-building practice, particularly, the creation of state nationalism, several 
parts of Kazak territories passed to Uzbekistan, and reciprocally, some Uzbek territories 
passed to Kazakstan. Ironically, some territories, such as the Mahta-Aral district,210 
passed from one side to another several times. 
According to the 1989 census, some 808,000 Kazaks lived in Uzbekistan and some 
332,000 Uzbeks in Kazakstan; today these numbers are supposed to reach at least 1.2 
205 "Kazakhstan Begins Planned Uzbek Border Troop Location," Inteifax, 12:24 GMT, 7 September 
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million and 400,000 respectively and because of the similar birth-rate among the two 
societies the ratio is not likely to change.211 There are considerable Uzbek minorities in 
all other Central Asian countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. In this 
regard Kazakstan seems relatively free of Uzbek influence. In contrast, in Uzbekistan 
the Kazak minority is more influential. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number 
of U zbekistani Kazaks migrated to Kazakstan for permanent residence. The Kazaks in 
Uzbekistan, the second largest Kazak society abroad after that of China, are spread all 
over the country, but the largest number of them (more than 500,000) live in Central 
Uzbekistan (Tashkent Oblast, Tashkent City, Syr-Darya Oblast).212 A great number of 
Uzbeks in Kazakstan live in the <;imkent region amounting to some 280,000 people.213 
After winning independence, the two countries did not intend to involve these 
minorities in their foreign policy. Several occasions of clashes between ethnic Kazaks 
and Uzbeks had been controlled and calmed down by officials. Therefore, the claims of 
the both sides- Uzbeks' aspirations to incorporate some regions of Southern Kazakstan, 
the former territories of the Khokand Khanate, into Uzbekistan and Kazaks' aspirations 
on Uzbekistan's present capital Tashkent, allegedly the lands of the Kazak Ulu Juz 
(Great Horde)- were so far not brought forward by the official organs of either country. 
B. Tajik- Afghan crisis and 'Radical Islam' 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the newly independent states started 
to mark Communism as an impending threat for the former Soviet territories. This 
attitude provided support for the republics' leadership, either from the West, from 
Russia or from other former Soviet states especially became the states were severely 
209 S. Kozlov. 
210 Ibid. 
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dependent on external aid during the period of transition. In this regard, Kazakstan was 
not an exception. The Kazak leadership was aware of the fact that without 
democratization, integration of the state's economy into the world economy, and 
elimination of an anti-Western orientation of foreign policy the country could not 
receive foreign aid which was indispensable condition for the leadership's survival. But 
towards the end of the 1990s the threat of Communism lost its former acuteness and the 
West became concerned with democratization and human rights, which became the 
requirements for economic aid. Thus, the task of preventing the spread of 'radical Islam', 
terrorism, and extremism, building regional stability, and the struggle against drug and 
arms smuggling would again show the region's key role in the world's stability, help to 
obtain foreign aid and become a legitimate base for anti- democratic sanctions. In this 
regard, Afghanistan with its ongoing civil war and Tajikistan, the unstable country in 
Central Asia, were presented as the cradle of 'Islamic International' and the so-called 
'bow of Islamic extremism'. The problem of Islamic extremism, craddledsomehow 
between Russia and the USA, and besides facilitating foreign support provides regional 
leaders with extra space for autocratic action. 
Kazakstan, due to its remoteness to the areas of tensions and the lack of extremist 
Islamic tradition and movements, is not as vulnerable as the other Central Asian states 
to Islamist movement, but it also tries to 'benefit' from the threat. In contrast to 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, Kazakstan is less concerned with and does not actively 
support the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Its peacekeeping troops in Tajikistan 
seemed under the jurisdiction of the CIS joint forces and never actively participated in 
serious combat or operations. T. Akimov asserts that Kazakstan deals only with the 
criminal and legal extension of the Afghan crisis and is interested in a stable and 
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peaceful Afghanistan as an alternative route for its mineral resources to the open sea.214 
The Kazak: government has expressed its apprehension about the growth of Islamic 
extremism on every occasion. Especially after the Russian involvement in Chechnia, it 
became a motto of Kazak foreign policy. Kazak:stan's attitude towards Islamic 
extremism, separatism, and terrorism keeps it in good terms with other Central Asian 
states, which have direct borders with other Islamic states and also leads Russia to tone 
down the protests against 'persecution' of Russians in Kazak:stan tacit. Kazak:stan tries to 
present itself to Russia as a shield against drug-trafficking and Islamic extremism, and 
tells Russia that it should "leave them on their own and do not interfere and they will do 
everything; only your interference and criticism obstruct their productivity. "215 
The Kazak: government supports peaceful resolution of the Afghan war: the then-
Kazak: Foreign Minister Tokayev stated that Kazak:stan "supports bringing an end to the 
war in Afghanistan and beginning talks on the resolution of the conflict. "216 In contrast 
to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Kazak:stan prefers not to condemn the Taliban regime as 
the reason for bloodshed and seems even to refrain from recognizing the Rabbani 
government as the sole legitimate power representing Afghanistan by ignoring the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the leadership of Mullah Omar, which controls 90 
% of its territory. At the meeting of five Central Asian presidents held in Almaty on 
February 28, 1997, the Kazak president did not make accusations against the Kandahar 
regime, as the Uzbek and Tajik presidents did, and no special decision was taken. 217 
Recently, after Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, the aide of President Putin, stated that Russia 
might use preventive air-strikes on Afghanistan, the Kazak: president said that there was 
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no need for such air-strikes.218 After Yastrzhembskiy's statement, the Taliban 
government warned Uzbekistan and Tajikistan that they would be held responsible for 
Russian attacks and threatened to use force against them. According to Erlan Karin, 
director of the Central Asian Agency of Political Researche, it was not surprising that 
the Taliban threatened to use force in response to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, because 
"Tajikistan- no matter how we say- is a Russian colony and to some extent-Uzbekistan-
under the circumstances of its peculiar relations with Russia, according their alliance in 
struggle against terrorism and extremism. "219 In February 2000, a plane hijacked by 
Afghans was permitted to land at AktObe (Aktyubinsk) airport in Kazakstan and was 
provided with food and fuel before taking off to London. 220 
Today Kazakstan seems aware of the inevitability of regarding the Taliban 
government as the factual power in Afghanistan and the fact that it could benefit from a 
stable Afghanistan, although it participates in 'anti-terrorist' forums under the CIS 
umbrella (the last of which was held in Almaty on May 19, 2000). In fact, the Afghan 
war and the spread of extremism are still the most important excuse for the Kazak 
government to increase its military power without annoying neighbouring states and to 
regulate the activity of domestic opposition. After 1999, particularly after the border 
incidents with Uzbekistan, Kazakstan started to modernize and improve the combat 
ability of its armed forces. In May 1997, the then-Kazak Defense Minister Muhtar 
Altmbayev stated that Kazakstan plans in the future "to transfer its army to work on a 
professional basis. "221 Following the border incident, Kazakstan intended to increase its 
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defence expenditures and provide extra tax privileges for arm producers. 222 The Kazak 
Defence Ministry ordered a number of the newest Russian military technologies, 
including several SU-27 and MIG-31 fighters and S-300 air-defence missile systems 
which started being delivered in 1999. Due to military reforms and new weapon 
deliveries, Kazakstan, with its army of only 68,000 personnel became the "most combat 
capable [country] in Central Asia."223 In January 2000, Marat Tazhin, Security Council 
Secretary of the Republic of Kazakstan, told that Kazakstan plans to allocate at least 1 
% of GDP to defence. Last year's military spending of $110 million was equal only to 
0.86 % of GDP.224 Beside military deliveries from Russia and privileges granted to 
domestic weapon producers, Kazakstan tries to gain support from external powers, 
especially NATO members. Recently, during the visit of the Kazak Defence Minister 
Sat Tokpakbayev to the USA, the countries agreed to the joint manoeuvres of the 
Central Asian Battalion in Kazakstan in September 2000. Another agreement was 
signed with the Turkish Defence Ministry in December 1999 and the Turkish side 
granted $600,000 unrefundable help for modernizing of communication systems of the 
Defence Ministry of the Republic of Kazakstan. 225 During the infiltration of the Islamic 
militants in Southern Kyrgyzstan in September 1999, it was reported that the Kazak Air 
Force bombed the militants' positions. However, the participation of the Kazak forces 
was denied by the Kazak PM Nurlan Balg1mbayev, although he admitted that Kazakstan 
provided some help to Kyrgyzstan with equipment and gear.226 
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Some of the above mentioned developments and changes have been complied in a 
single document, the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Kazakstan, which -approved 
by a presidential decree on February 10, 2000- renewed the former doctrine adopted 
two years ago. Certain issues that did not take place in the former doctrine have been 
confirmed in a new one. Interestingly, the doctrine says that "the nearest surroundings 
of the country might be either potential allies or 'irritants' of the problem of security"; 
also "excessive quantitative and qualitative increase in military power of some 
countries" are named among the main threats for the country.227 
C. Kazakstan and the Caspian Oil 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kazak economy had considerably 
declined especially because of the drop in the production rate of oil and gas the most 
important pillars of the Kazak economy. In this regard, petroleum and gas production in 
the Caspian Sea region became probably the most important source for the state budget 
and supply of hard currency. Besides practical gains, the existence of rich oil and gas 
reserves improves the financial credibility of the state and attracts foreign investment. 
Between 1997 and 1999, $2.7 billion was directly invested in the oil and gas industry of 
Kazakstan. 228 Kazakstan's rich oil reservess and the existence of several 'prospective' 
transportation routes grants it some political bargaining power, which the new republic 
is likely to utilize .. 
Unlike the rest of its foreign policy, the Caspian oil policy of Kazakstan presents 
diverse perspective in international arena: the country seeks close relations with Russia 
and uses its pipelines as the only functioning export means for now; it encourages 
cooperation with Western petroleum companies to supply its oil to the world. Also there 
is possiblity of cooperation with regional Asian states, such as Turkey, Iran, and China. 
227 "Voyennaya duktrina Kazakhstana: armiya poluchit garantirovannoe finansirovaniye," Panorama 
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Commenting on diversity, Kazak president said that "here we are interested in a 
practical side of the matter, but not political. Kazakstan should start the transportation of 
its oil to the world market as soon and as profitable as possible. "229 
On September 10, 1999, a protocol that confirms the will of two countries regarding 
the transportation of the Caspian oil via Turkey to the world market was signed in 
Ankara between this Kazakstan and Turkey. 230 Alongside with Turkey and Western 
states, Kazakstan cooperates with other countries, namely China and Iran, which will be 
focused on in the following parts of this work. 
For Kazakstan, it is crucial to delineate the dividing water lines in the Caspian Sea 
as soon as possible; despite mention of a verbal consensus on the matter between the 
governments of Russia and Kazakstan.231 Kazakstan is anxious about the growth of 
Russian activity in the region, including investment of $9 billion to develop petroleum 
producing infrastructure of its sector. 232 Kazakstan still claims its rights over the 
Khvalynskoye deposit in the border zone that was recently explored by Russian LUK-
Oil. A few months ago the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation 
prohibited the transportation of Kazak oil via Russian pipelines, arguing that the export 
of Kazak oil via Russia cannot be regarded as transit because the oil that initially flows 
from Kazakstan and that is exported at Russian ports (mixed with Russian oil) is not the 
same oil. 233 This problem was solved during Nazarbayev's official visit to Moscow in 
June 2000, when the Russian Ministry of Energy stated that the transportation of Kazak 
oil was in Russia's interests.234 
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2. Sino- Kazak relations: an alternative pole 
A. Trade and economic development 
Following the collapse of the Soviet regime, its economic ties, and regional 
cooperation, Kazakstan started to develop other relations with regional and outside 
countries. The diversity of its relations would simultaneously underpin its sovereignty 
while also providing cheaper goods and exporting Kazakstan' s domestic production. 
Any possible alternative to the Russian economy would lessen Kazakstan's dependency 
on Russia and would contribute to the republic's independence. Under these 
circumstances, China started to dominate the region and had certain advantages that 
strengthened its position. First, China with its enormous population, export-import 
potential, and rapidly growing industry, provides a lucrative market for Kazakstan's gas-
and-oil-dependent economy and is able to replace Russian imports with its cheaper 
basic consumer goods. Kazakstan has a direct border with China so it might avoid 
Russia's political pressure and influence in exporting its own production, especially that 
of the oil sector. Secondly, China could certainly attract Kazakstan with its "economic 
miracle of achieving rapid modernization without sacrificing political control. "235 While 
Western powers, and sometimes even Russia, deal with the political and legal sides of 
development (such as lessening of state control over the economy, granting equal 
opportunities, and developing means of political supervision), China never urges 
Kazakstan to install democratic institutions or to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in 
the republic. Another reason for the burst of trade and economic relations between the 
two countries, as Shireen Hunter asserts, is the highly complementary natures of the two 
235 Olcott, CANS, p. 35. 
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economies, whereas the instability in Afghanistan and sanctions over Iran makes China 
the "shortest and cheapest outlet. .. to the outside world. "236 
According to Chinese Customs statistics, Sino-Kazak trade amounted to $390 
million in 1995 (increased by 17.7 % from 1994 trade), where the Kazak export 
amounted $324.5 million (increased by 47.5 %) and import from China amounted to 
$65.5 million (a decrease of 37.5 %); in 1996 the volume of trade between the two 
countries reached $497 .5 million. 237 Trade and economic relations between China and 
Kazakstan are likely to grow considerably and have already made China its greatest 
trading partner after Russia. Not surprisingly, the balance of trade is prone to change in 
China's favour. Economic ties between the two countries are also bolstered by 
cooperation in scientific, cultural, and military fields, such as the Agreement on 
Scientific and Technological Cooperation signed on December 30, 1994, in Almaty238 
and an agreement on supplying the Chinese Navy with Kazak-made torpedoes.239 But 
for Kazakstan, especially in recent years, Sino-Kazak cooperation in the field of oil 
production and transportation via China has obtained a vital importance. 
According to Viktor Gilinsky, world oil consumption will increase to 90 million 
barrels per day, in which Asian oil consumption will even surpass.240 By the year 2005, 
Chinese demands for oil imports are expected to increase to 2 million barrels per day, or 
about 38 % of total consumption.241 As culmination China's growing need for oil, an 
important contract was signed by the Kazak State Committee on Investments, the 
Aktyubmunaygaz Company of Kazakstan, and the Chinese National Petroleum 
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Company (CNPC) on September 26, 1997. According to the contract, which will be 
valid for 20 years, CNPC will provide $4 billion in investments and during this period 
the Kazak budget will receive $3.16 billion by means of income and local taxes, bonus 
and excise duties. 242 Another agreement signed in Almaty September 1997 stipulates 
the construction of a pipeline from Western Kazakstan to Western China, which would 
become an alternative to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium established in 1992 to 
transport the Tengiz oil from Kazakstan to the Russian Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk.243 By now, the transportation of Kazak oil to China is provided mainly 
by railway. In 1998, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was to buy as much as one 
million tonnes of oil from Kazakstan via railway, and according to experts, might 
become Kazakstan's major oil consumer.244 Then-acting Prime Minister of Kazakstan 
Ahmedjan Esimov stated that a package of Kazak-Chinese agreements on Caspian oil 
and its transportation was estimated at $9.5 billion.245 The possible transportation of 
Kazak oil via China to Japan and other Southeast Asian countries is also being 
considered among Kazakstan's prospective deals. 
Kazakstan, hampered by its disadvantageous position of being land-locked country, 
and highly dependence on Russian transportation routes, considers the Chinese 
alternative as one of the most important and profitable solutions. Kazakstan has direct 
rail, air, and highway links with China and strives to develop their diversity and 
capacity. During a summer 1991 visit to China, president Nazarbayev offered to extend 
the current Almaty-Urumchi and Beijing air routes and use it as a transit base from 
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Kazakstan to Japan and South Korea. Also he offered to increase the volume of 
transportation of the railroad line between China and Russia via Kazakstan. 246 Another 
agreement signed during the September 1995 visit of Nazarbayev to China dealt with 
Kazakstan's trade exchanges with Pacific and Southeast Asian countries to be conducted 
via the Chinese port of Lianyungang saving some 5,000 km in transport, while the 
distance from Kazakstan to this port is 3,500 km, while that to the nearest Russian Far 
Eastern port is 8,500km. 247 
246 Hafeez Malik, "New Relationship Between Central and Southeastern Asia and Pakistan's Regional 
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B. Eastern Turkestan and Kazakstan's policy 
The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Province (XUAP), or Eastern Turkestan, has a 
great strategic, economic, and political importance for Sino-Kazak relations. 
Recognition of Chinese supremacy over the region and 'non-intervention' in domestic 
affairs has been a long-standing condition for Kazakstan's relations with China. 
Kazakstan has certain historical linkages with Eastern Turkestan, which was formally 
incorporated into the Chinese Empire in 1884. In 1933, and again in 1944, an 
independent Eastern Turkestan Republic composed of Kazaks and Uygurs was 
established. 248 According to the Chinese statistics, some 1, 111, 718 ethnic Kazaks live in 
Eastern Turkestan249 (Kazaks claim that there are at least 1,500,000) and a considerable 
number of ethnic Uygurs (the largest ethnic group in Eastern Turkestan many of whom 
fled to Kazakstan in 1930s through early 1960s)250 live in Kazakstan. The Muslim 
population of China, which 'is severely suppressed by the Chinese government, suffered 
from a policy of assimilation and planned immigration of the Chinese into the region. 
As a result, the Muslim population has become resistant to the regime making the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) govermnet anxious, especially after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and growth of ethnic and religious awareness throughout Central Asia. 
According to controversial official Chinese figures, among with the Province's total 
population of 15.2 million, the Uygurs represent the largest ethnic community with 7.19 
million (47.5 %), Kazaks comprise 7.3 %, ethnic Chinese Muslims comprise 782,000 
(4.5 %) and some other ethnic groups such as Kirghiz and Mongols number 140,000 
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(0.8 %) each.251 While 60.1 % of the region's entire population consist of Muslims, the 
number of Chinese has risen to 5.7 million (37.6 %).252 The ethnic Kazak minority in 
Eastern Turkestan represents the largest Kazak community of some 4.5 million Kazaks 
living outside Kazakstan. In contrast to the People's Republic of China's other regions, 
Eastern Turkestan is still largely controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), not 
the Armed Police, and the province still suffers from the nuclear weapons testing center 
at Lob Nor, which also places a great number of military staff in the region.253 
With the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic China the 
Kazak government recognized that, 
[T]he government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China and 
that Taiwan is the indivisible part of the Chinese territory. The Government of the Re~ublic of 
Kazakstan guarantees, that it would not establish any kind of official relations with Taiwan.2 4 
Although, there is no such a direct official statement on the non-involvement of 
Kazakstan in Eastern Turkestan, the Kazak government guarantees this under the guise 
of the struggle against separatism, terrorism, and ethnic strife. In order to satisfy its 
greatest southern neighbour introducing security guarantees to the Republic of 
Kazakstan, the Kazak government not only refrains from displaying concern for its 
fellow Kazaks or other kin communities in Eastern Turkestan and their problems, but 
also commits itself "to prevent advocates of an 'East[ern] Turkestan Republic' from 
working against China and interfering in Xinjiang from the territory of Kazakstan. "255 In 
July 1996, the two countries signed a "treaty on mutual extradition of criminals and 
criminal suspects. "256 Following several occasions of extradition of ethnic Uygurs who 
had fled to Kazakstan, the republic was regarded as having "collaborated with Chi'nese 
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authorities and violated international treaties by peremptorily returning to China those 
ethnic Uighurs from China who have fled to Kazakstan and claimed political refugee 
status by reason of racial persecution. "257 
In addition to the province's strategic and demographic importance, Eastern 
Turkestan plays a key economic role either for China, Kazakstan, and the entire Central 
Asian region. The Treaty of Principles and Main Trends of the Promotion of 
Cooperation between the province and the then-Kazak SSR was signed during President 
Nazarbayev's visit to XUAP.258 In 1991, the total volume of trade between the Central 
Asian republics and the Province amounted to $1 billion and in 1992 it reached $2 
billion. 259 Following this, the Chinese government granted five cities in the province the 
same rights as the ten 'open cities' on the East coast.260 The growing relations with 
Kazakstan also spurred the economic development of Eastern Turkestan, in which more 
than 70 % of the region's external economic exchanges were conducted with Central 
Asian countries, 261 attracting investments to the region and improving its welfare. 
C. The Shanghai Forum 
The Shanghai Agreement on Confidence-building in the Military Field in Border 
Areas, which created the 'Shanghai Five', was signed on April 26, 1996, between the 
People's Republic China and four former Soviet neighbouring states: Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. The agreement stipulates the mutual dislocation of 
military troops and armament, except border troops, from the border zone of 100 km; 
the parties agreed to refrain from providing military manoeuvres targeting another side 
256 "Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev, Jiang Zemin Sign Joint Declaration," Interfax, 07:36 GMT, 5 July 1996; in 
FBIS-SOV-96-130. 
257 Cutler. 
258 Tokayev, p. 192. 
259 Ferdinand, "The New Central Asia," p. 102. 
260 Ibid. 
261 "Xinjiang Increasing Ties with Central Asian Republics," Xinhua, 03:36 GMT, 3 March 1995; in 
FBIS-CHI-95-042. 
70 
and limit of the scale of manoeuvres and the number of staff attending them. 262 Also, 
signatories to the treaty would be able to observe military exercises in order to prevent 
any dangerous military activities. 263 
The Republic of Kazakstan actively participated in the Shanghai Five meetings, 
providing it with some advantages. First, it was a forum where the republic could 
contact and observe its two great neighbours. Second, the implementation of the 
agreement could free it from the heavy burden of armament and avoid unfavourable 
tension. Lastly, the Shanghai Five was more than just a military or border agreement by 
providing certain economic cooperation opportunities. Initially, Russia sponsored talks 
with China and Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on their common border issue 
and the limitation of troops and weapons. In April 1995, such negotiations were held in 
Moscow between the working groups of the countries. 264 
At the summit meeting of the Shanghai Five leaders held in Bishkek, on August 25, 
1999, the participants concluded a declaration in which the members expressed their 
resoluteness "not to permit the use of the territories of their countries for the 
organization of activities violating the sovereignty, security, and public order of any of 
the five states. "265 Besides lending support for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in 
Central Asia, the participants unofficially condemned separatism and 'Islamic 
fundamentalism'. 266 
The recent meeting of the Shanghai Five held in July 2000 in Dushanbe, was 
distinguished from the previous meetings in several ways .. The Dushanbe summit was 
the first meeting of the Shanghai Five series attended by the new Russian President 
262 Bakayev and Urpekov, p. 41. 
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Vladimir Putin whose neo-imperialist policies forced him to keep close to his eastern 
neighbours. In February 2000, Putin, then acting president and Prime Minister, 
appointed Vladimir Vorobyev as the special envoy to the Shanghai Five. 267 The 
Shanghai Five summit had great importance for the new Russian leader and probably 
was the only forum where he could get official support for his 'anti-separatist' and 'anti-
terrorist' operations in Chechnia. Interestingly, Kazakstan was the only country that did 
not face any threat of 'Islamic extremism' whatsoever. Its greatest threat is Russian 
separatism in the north and the border dispute with China. The Dushanbe summit was 
attended by the Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who did not attend the previous 
meetings. The leader of Uzbekistan, whose country does not have common borders with 
Russia and China, is deeply concerned with the struggle against his opposition which, 
has been alleged to cooperate with Islamic militants. 
Before the summit started, the foreign ministers of the member states signed a 
communique on the joint struggle against terrorism, even committing large-scale 
antiterrorist operations. Additionally, the sides decided to cooperate in the economic 
and cultural spheres. 268 The leaders of participating states again expressed their 
opposition to interference in the interior affairs of other states even "under the excuse of 
humanitarian intervention and protection of human rights." 269 Besides Uzbekistan, some 
other regional states, namely Mongolia, India, and Iran, expressed their interest in 
cooperation with the Shanghai Five (henceforth called Shanghai Forum. 270 
D. The border issue and Chinese expansionism 
266 Ibid. 
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268 Panorama (Almaty), No. 27, 09 June. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid. 
72 
The 1,700 km271 long Sino-Kazak border, a legacy of the Soviet and Russian 
imperial regime was settled by the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881 and further provisions 
of 1883, 1904, and 1915.272 This border is one of the most vulnerable chains of Kazak 
national security, where it perceives threat. Throughout history, China expressed its 
imperial mood to expand to the Central Asia through incorporation of lands and 
assimilation of native population. In the past, and especially during Mao's rule, China 
laid certain claims on Kazak border territories and intended to change the border, 
namely in 1968 and 1971 and in 1992, after Kazakstan became an independent state, the 
Chinese ambassador to Kazakstan argued that the Kazak-Chinese border needed 
correction.273 It is said that the Chinese term Xi Yu, meaning 'Northwest province' in 
Chinese is an "historical designation for an area encompassing much of Central 
Asia. "274 The Chinese territorial claims are underpinned by the great involvement of 
China in Kazak economy, immigration, and the settlement of Chinese in Kazakstan. 
While in the 1989 census no Chinese were counted, it is estimated that some 300,000-
350,000 Chinese live in the republic today. 275 Also, it is well-known that the Chinese 
armed forces located in the region are superior in armament and number to the armed 
forces of Russia and the CIS countries located in Central Asia. 276 Also the Chinese 
nuclear testing center situated at Lob Nor, is only 900 km from the Kazak border and 
only 1,200 km from Almaty. From 1964 to 1992, 38 nuclear bombs were tested there 
and those before 1980 were exploded in the air, causing harmful radiation for the whole 
region. 277 This actual Chinese threat prevents Kazakstan and other Central Asian states 
from distancing itself too far from the Russian Army as the only power to rely in case of 
271 Shaumian, p.- 70. 
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Chinese invasion, despite the Chinese promise given to Kazakstan, that "it would never 
use nuclear weapons against it" on February 8, 1995.278 
One of the most sensitive issues in Sino-Soviet relations, the border issue between 
China and Kazakstan, was fixed by signing an 'historic' border accord on April 26, 1994 
-exactly two years before of the signing of the Shanghai Agreement- during the visit of 
the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to Kazakstan.279 Negotiations on defining today's 
Sino-Kazak border began in the 1970s and "were near completion when the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1991," leaving a stretch of 73 km undefined.28° Following the 
agreement, the joint Kazak-Chinese commission on the border demarcation was 
established. And in 1996 and July 1998, the two sides signed two complementary 
agreements on border issues, both during the visits of the Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin to Kazakstan.281 During the negotiations, the Chinese side pressed its claims over 
a 364-square-mile area of disputed territories and launched a project of diverting up to 
40 % of border rivers to China, and under this pressure Kazakstan agreed to cede 157 
square-miles to China.282 
The Kazak Government tried to derive benefit from the Shanghai Five meetings at 
any possible stage, i.e. tete-a-tete meetings of Kazak and Chinese presidents. During the 
Bishkek Round of the Shanghai Five, the two presidents "completely solved all border 
problems between the two countries."283 During the latest summit of the Shanghai 
Forum, President Nazarbayev also stated that the border problems were actually 
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solved.284 In June 2000, other negotiations on the issue of border rivers were held in 
China, after which the Chinese side decided "'to take Kazakhstani interests into account' 
when outlining all the projects on construction of any objects on and/or along the rivers 
crossing the borders of the two countries. "285 
284 Panorama (Almaty), No. 09 June 2000. 
285 Kazakh News, June 27 2000. 
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CHAPTER III: KAZAKSTAN AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD 
1. Kazak-Turkish relations: a gate to the West 
Kazak-Turkish relations at the governmental level are full of inconsistencies, 
although they provide important indicators for both countries' foreign policy 
preferences. While during its first years of independence, Kazakstan adhered its 
'integrationist' aspirations for the former Soviet state, the Turkish Republic was fully 
involved in its attempts to become a full member of the European Union and any other 
institution over the Western European space. While Kazakstan was trying to preserve 
the gentle balance of its relations between Russia, China, Western and Islamic worlds 
and build its first bricks of independent statehood, Turkey dealt with its 'Kurdish' 
problem domestically and with the Cyprus and Aegean Sea problems in the 
international arena, facing protests and vetos of Greece, a full member of the NATO and 
the EU. The rise of Islamic Welfare Party (RP) and general political instability of 
governments and their sudden poicy changes obstructed the conduct of a stable policy 
towards Kazakstan or Central Asia in general. 
Since its formation in 1923 under the leadership of Kemal Atatilrk, the Turkish 
Republic made the principles of 'Westernism' and 'Laicism' the main pillars of its 
international orientation, aiming also to integrate its economy and political system into 
that of Western Europe. Today, 53 % of Turkish exports and 44 % of its import occur 
with the EU countries. 286 Even the USA share in Turkish export and imports is 
considerably lower: 6 % and 11 % respectively.287 On the eve of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Turkey suffered from the disruption of formally vivid economic relations 
with the Arab countries, which became an important source of hard currency during the 
Oil Crisis. Especially after the Gulf War and the establishment of an economic embargo 
286 Alejandro V. Lorca,"Tiirkiye: Orta Asya'ya A~tlan Kap1," Avrasya Etudleri (Ankara), Vol.2, No. 3 
(Autumn 1995), p. 63. 
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on Iraq, Turkish economic relations with the Arab world sizeably declined. In addition, 
the establishment of close Turkish-Israeli relations in military and intelligence fields 
seriously 'offended' Arab countries - reflected in economic transactions. Following the 
collapse of the bipolar global system, Turkey started to lose its former privileged status 
of a 'fort against the Communist expansion' and the West began to dwell on the human 
and minority rights violations in Turkey. In the post-Soviet world Armenian lobbies in 
major Western countries strengthened its activities against Turkey, while the latter's 
serious attempts to be integrated into the EU faced Greek vetos. Under these changing 
circumstances, Turkey launched an increased involvement in the Central Asian Turkic 
states in order to increase Turkey's bargaining potential by providing some political, 
economic, and military advantages. 
On March 15, 1991, the last year of the Soviet Union, an agreement on cooperation 
was signed between the Turkish Republic and the then-Kazak SSR and on December 
16, 1991, Turkey was the first state to recognize the independence of the Republic of 
Kazakstan. 288 Despite close ethnic, linguistic and historical kinship, the two countries 
had been sharply disrupted by rival ideologies. Practically, they had no direct relations 
until the last few months of the Soviet statehood. Interestingly, all political movements 
in Turkey tried to gain political credits from the emerging relations with the Central 
Asian newly independent states. The relations with the Central Asian 'brothers' became 
a matter of major importance, and almost every Turkish Prime Minister visited Central 
Asia. Graham E. Fuller had noted that there was no actual difference between Islamic 
and nationalistic newspapers in their support for the Central Asian Turkic peoples. 289 
The Central Asian republics, and Kazakstan in particular, became a lucrative market for 
287 Ibid. 
288 Tokayev, p.509. 
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the Turkish medium-scale manufacturing sector and the construction industry, which 
had been in stagnation after the stopping of gigantic building fields in the oil-rich Arab 
countries. 
On April 9-11, 1993, Turkish President Turgut Ozal paid his first official visit to 
Kazakstan. During his visit, a number of trade and economic agreements were reached 
and the first International Kazak-Turkish University named after Ahmed Yesevi was 
inaugurated in Southern Kazakstan. Also, the two presidents declared that the settlement 
of peace in Bosnia, Mountainous Karabag, and in the Middle East was possible only 
through peace negotiations based on the UN and OECD peacekeeping efforts. 290 
During the first years of Kazakstan' s independence, the nature of its relations with 
Turkey was a dilemma for the young state. On the one hand, Turkey, a congenial nation 
and state, a member of the NATO and the Council of Europe, was close to the West 
politically and economically, and might provide moral and material support for the 
devastated economy of Kazakstan. In the international arena, Turkey was to become a 
guaranteed ally, and more importantly, an influential lobby. Turkey was among the 
countries that realized the actual power of the republics' leaders. Contrary to Western 
countries, Turkey never criticized the unlimited power of Central Asian leaders and 
refrained from supporting, at least at official level, the opposition groups to the ruling 
power, a position which made Turkey a partner comfortable for elites. After the 
dissolution of the Kazak parliament by President Nazarbayev in March 1995, Turkish 
President Siileyman Demirel found his actions as "a convincing confirmation of the 
triumph of true democracy and the rule of law and evidence of Nursultan Nazarbayev' s 
adherence to the observance of constitutional principles"(emphasis added).291 Besides 
Nazarbayev's cordial relations with the former Turkish president and other Turkish 
290 Tokayev, p. 510. 
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politicians, the Kazak president often visits Turkey, both officially and unofficially, 
often spending his holidays in Turkey. As one Russian newspaper has argued, he builds 
a summer residence in the famous Turkish resort town of Kerner. 292 
On the other hand, any serious involvement in Turkish affairs, not to mention so-
called Pan-Turkist aspirations, could affect the new republic's sensitive relations with 
Russia and China. 293 The advancement of its Turkic identity at official level could cause 
the displeasure of the republic's Russian and Slavic population, who have already been 
discontented about the promotion of the 'Kazakness' of the state. Despite the huge 
volume of trade, amounting to $5 billion294 and construction of long-term contracts 
between Turkey and Russia, the policies of these two countries compete in the region. 
Russia, which tries to re-gain its former superiority and influence over Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, accuses Turkey of acting on America's behalf "to buy the Muslims of 
Central Asia."295 Accordingly, Russia launched an anti-Turkish media propaganda, 
which, while not being harsh, has influenced public opinion, especially that of the 
Central Asian states. Commenting on the complexity of circumstances encompassing 
Kazakstan's foreign policy orientation, the Kazak Foreign Minister of Tokayev has 
stated that, 
Turkey mostly negatively reacts against the expansion of Moscow's economic pressure in the 
Caspian Sea, especially in cases related to the transportation of oil. Russia, on the other hand, hardly 
avoids it fears about the phantom of Pan-Turkism and its habit to regard the developments of 
relations between Kazakstan and Muslim states as an approval of the thesis about Islamic solidarity. 
And the United States is prone to estimate any contacts with Iran as actions of anti-American 
in cl inati on. 296 
A. Turkic Summits 
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In regard to the regional states, Turkey enjoys its peculiar feature of being a 
congenial state for the Central Asian Turkic states: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Tajikistan while being a Persian-speaking state, belongs 
to the Sunnite sect of Islam that makes it different from Shiite Iran, although the 
linguistic link should not be underestimated. Besides being the first country to recognize 
the Cental Asian republics' independence and establish the embassies there, as well as 
the first country to host the republics' presidents, Turkey has launched an active policy 
towards cooperation between the Turkic-speaking countries, including Turkey, the four 
Central Asian states, and Azerbaijan. The most prominent realization of this cooperation 
was the 'Turkic summits' which were held on a systematic basis. The importance of 
these summits is likely to be unseen, but, in fact, they had a vital role for participants, 
especially for the Newly Independent States. First, the summits were among the very 
few forums where the Central Asian states could meet without Russian supervision. 
Second, it was a place where the Central Asian states could consider their own problems 
and disputes, for the most times under the balanced intermediation of Turkey. Third, it 
was a platform in which the participants, except Kirghizstan, were parties with direct 
interest in Caspian oil, gas production, and transportation. Thus, there they could 
negotiate and determine their claims and interests before other international negotiations 
directly concerned with the case became involved. Finally, in addition to all its cultural 
and economic issues, the sides could harmonize their foreign policy trends and attempts 
toward certain issues. 
In January 1992, the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) was 
established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop a "legal framework for 
liberalization ... democratization ... and management cadres ... necessary to help the new 
republics adjust the outside world not only politically and economically but also 
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socially and culturally."297 In 1995, a special Minister of State for the relations with the 
Turkic states was established within the Turkish government and obtained a permanent 
status in the Cabinet. 298 
The first summit meeting of the 'Turkic summits• series was held in Ankara on 
October 30-31. 1992, and was concluded by the signing of the Ankara Declaration on 
October 31.299 A number of agreements were signed, such as setting up 
telecommunication links, elimination of the travel restrictions, 300 and calls for "a social 
order, set up on a basis of democratic principles, respect of the human rights, 
secularism, social justice, and market economy."301 But the Kazak President expressed 
his caution about the establishment of a linguistic/ethnic community, arguing that it 
"does not bring people together but divides them. "302 As it is often argued, the Central 
Asian states which suffered from 'the younger brother• complex for a long time, simply 
did want Turkish overlordship. 303 
The second Turkic summit meeting held in Istanbul on October 18-19, 1994, was 
concluded with the signing of the Istanbul Declaration. Interestingly, among the issues 
considered at the summit (such as setting of Armenian-Azerbaijani and Tajik-Afghan 
problems) the participants expressed their views about Bosnia and Cyprus.304 As the 
Kazak Foreign Minister Tokayev asserted, Turkey admitted the fact that Kazakstan 
would not jeopardize its interests in Russian and other regional interests while also 
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pointing out that Turkey would continue to pay more attention to its relations with the 
USA and Europe.305 
After the Istanbul summit, the meetings of the Turkic Summits held in Bishkek 
( 1995), Tashkent ( 1996), and Astana ( 1998) started to lose their primal importance, 
while bilateral relations became more important. Especially after the cooling of Uzbek-
Turkish relations, the homogeneity of Turkish relations with the Cental Asian republics 
was damaged. The President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, did not participate 
the Fifth Turkic Summit in Astana which was instead attended by the Chairman of the 
Turkmen Parliament Sahad Muradov, while both President Karimov of Uzbekistan and 
Niyazov did not participate in the last of the summits which was held in Balm in April 
2000. 
B. Turkey and the Caspian Oil. 
Despite the fact that "the main foreign policy objective of the current Turkish 
government (like that of its predecessors) is to secure Turkey's admission to the EU"306 
and that the "economic collapse and political disorder in the new Central Asian states 
pose no direct threat 1iO Turkey, whereas it is possible to imagine any number of 
scenarios in which developments in Russia would have a direct impact on policymakers 
in Ankara,"307 Turkey became actively involved in Central Asia and was for the most 
part confronted by Russian discontent. One of the most important reasons that has 
spurred Turkish involvement in the region is the energy resources of the Caspian Sea -
oil and gas- that could strengthen the Turkish position in Europe and the whole world 
both in economic and political terms. 
Turkey, with its growing population and economy and lack of hydrocarbon energy 
resources, is itself severely dependent on external energy support. In fact, the Caspian 
305 Ibid., pp. 511-512. 
306 Winrow, p. 91. 
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Sea resources seem optimal for Turkey's economic, foreign and security policy because 
supplies from Iran, Russia or the Arab countries affect its relations with Europe and the 
USA. Also, construction of a pipeline through Turkey to Europe would become the sole 
stable route for oil and gas transportation for the land-locked Central Asian countries 
making Turkey the major energy outlet to Europe as well as reaping with economic 
gains through transportation and service fees. 
Kazakstan has oil reserves that are estimated to be 2-4 billion tonnes (15-30 billion 
barrels) and its production is projected to be 0.8 million barrels per day in 2000 and 
double that range in 2010.308 Kazak gas reserves are estimated to be of nearly 2 trillion 
cubic meters, which is equal to three times the annual consumption of the USA. 309 
Kazakstan, together with Azerbaijan, regards the Caspian as a closed sea, which 
stipulates the establishment of the sovereign rights of each of the littoral states to its 
own 'economic zone' (mineral wealth, shelf, territorial waters, etc.) in accordance with 
the UN Convention on Maritime Law. While the other Caspian bordering states -
Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan- argue that the Caspian Sea is a lake._ a closed body of 
water, relying on 1921 and 1940 treaties. The status of a lake stipulates the common 
possession of the Caspian, which, beyond doubt, will serve the interests of Russia, the 
greatest power in the region both economically and technologically. 310 Turkey, though 
mostly concerned about the transportation of the Caspian oil, tacitly supports the 
position of Kazakstan and Azerbaijan over the status of the Caspian Sea. Interestingly, 
Kazakstan developed cordial political and economic relations with Azerbaijan. 
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Meanwhile, the two countries seem to be the mo.st 'ardent' supporters of Turkish 
interests in the region. The Kazak government informed the CIS countries, including the 
members of the Customs Union -Belarus, Russia, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan- that from 
July 1, 2000 onwards it would introduce restrictive remedies towards the import of 
petroleum and chemistry related goods, including customs tax of 10-30 %.311 This could 
be interpreted as Kazakstan's de facto withdrawal from the Customs Union. Most 
surprisingly, Kazakstan did not inform Azerbaijan about the introduction of such 
provisions towards it.312 
Despite being called the 'fiasco' of Turkish policy in the region or the 'betrayal' of 
the Central Asian countries by Turkish media (especially after the signing of Russo-
Turkmen and Russo-Kazak agreements on oil and gas transportation via Russian 
pipelines -the sole existing transportation means) Turkey still plays an important role in 
the Caspian oil issue. Turkey enjoys the support of the West and its means of essential 
pressure over oil transportation via its control of the straits on ecological grounds is 
formidable. Thus it is likely to play a more active role in the future. Turkey's aspirations 
for integration into the EU and the recently signed agreement with the EU on energy 
supplies could bolster its position in the Caspian Sea in the future. 
C. Kazak-Turkish relations on the eve of the 21st century 
In the second half of the 1990s, Turkish-Central Asian relations were stabilized. The 
expectations and initial euphoria of both sides were not attained. Turkey could not 
obtain the dominant position among the regional states to replace Russian influence. 
Central Asian states finally realized that having Turkey as a close ally was not enough 
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to get external support, either financial or political, and that Russia was still an 
important chain for their development, at least for a while. Although often 
underestimated, Turkey played a great role in the reinforcement of the states' 
independence and the development of their economies with its financial, technical, and 
educational support. Interestingly, private entrepreneurs and their personal efforts 
facilitated Turkish involvement in Kazak economy notwithstanding opposite 
developments at the governmental level. Also, many Turkish specialists and companies 
are engaged in fulfilment of many projects initiated and financed by Western 
companies, especially in the field of construction, making the real range of Turkish 
involvement seem less than it really is. 
Kazak-Turkish bilateral trade reached $112 million in 1993 (increased by 300 % 
over 1992).313 For the first ten months of 1996, trade amounted to $152.7 million, where 
Kazak export amounted to $41.6 million and imports- $111.1 million. 314 In addition to 
governmental credits of $200 million provided by the Turkish government in 1992, 
some 319 Turkish companies launched production in Kazakstan among 2200 foreign 
companies and some 200 Turkish companies were planning or started to realize 42 
projects with a total value of $2 billion.315 As the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
of State of the Turkish Republic Devlet Bah~eli had noted in 1998, exports to Kazakstan 
from Turkey had increased to $212 million while imports from Kazakstan reached $253 
million and also argued that the volume of trade could reach $1 billion in coming 
years.316 
Besides the Turkish contribution to the republic's econoffilc and political 
development, Turkey created a new 'society' that is akin to Turkish culture and language 
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through a number of student exchange programs and the establishment of educational 
institutions at the elementary, secondary, and higher educational levels. Along with 
more than 100 Turkish schools with some 2,000 teaching staff and 20,000 students317 
established all over the 'Turkic world', Turkey provided some 15,584 scholarships318 
for Turks outside of Turkey. 
Turkish-Central Asian relations m general, and Kazak-Turkish relations in 
particular, also provided certain advantages to the Turkish political and geostrategic 
position along with the economic gains. First, the Turkish republic seems to have 
obtained a new bloc of allies among regional countries that will facilitate Turkey's key 
role in the region. It might be that the new states enlarged Turkish vision and bargaining 
power, especially in its relations with Europe. Second, Turkey enjoyed support and 
understanding from these countries, at least to some extent, for its Kurdish and Cyprus 
problems and naturally gained an additional number of advocates at international 
forums. Kazakstan was among the countries to support Turkish government's efforts "to 
preserve the stability and territorial integrity of the country,"319 while the Kazak Foreign 
Ministry audibly named the PKK (so-called Kurdistan Working Party) a ''terrorist 
organization. "320 
For Kazakstan, as for any other Central Asian newly independent states, Turkey is a 
gate to the outside world, both economically and politically, and Turkish support really 
contributed its independent state-building. Turkey, a state with an "Eurasian version of 
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Western democracy and market economy,"321 was regarded as an optimal vector of 
development for the newly independent Muslim Turkic states. Moreover, the secularism 
of the Turkish state system made it a preferable option for other Muslim states. 
According to Alejandro V. Lorca, Turkey would play the same role as Spain played for 
Latin American countries in relations with the EU, which is described by so-called 
'bridge theory', according to which certain linkages with Spain, such as historical and 
linguistic ones, facilitate economic relations of Latin American states with the EU 
countries along with Spain's special role of a 'natiral lobby' in favour of Latin American 
states.322 
Stileyman Demirel, then the Turkish Prime Minister, declared that "in Central Asia 
we are the emissaries of Europe. We are Europeans who are taking European values to 
Central Asia. We want to remain European."323 For Kazakstan it was a great chance to 
have an 'European brother'. It is beyond doubt that the Turkish dimension of its foreign 
policy would remain a most important one. The Republic of Kazakstan is not yet able to 
fully enjoy and emphasize its Muslim or Turkic identity, which-contrary the other 
Central Asian states- Kazakstan seems to have more balanced relations. The Uzbek 
government blamed Turkey for support to its opposition. Turkmenistan builds its 
system of 'neutrality' which seems to be more like an 'iron curtain' for its dictatorship. 
And Kirghizstan, which seems far from having a continuous policy, is prone to regard 
Islamic countries as a direct threat to its security. Therefore, Kazakstan might be the 
only country in the region to conduct a multi-dimensional policy, in which the Turkic 
and Muslim worlds are among the top priorities of its foreign policy orientation. 
321 V. Volodin, Izvestiya, 27 Apr 1992; cited by Smolansky, p. 306. 
322 Alejandro V. Lorca, p. 63. 
323 Anthony Hyman, "Central Asia and the Middle East: The Emerging Links," in Mesbahi (ed.) Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, p. 258. 
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2. Kazakstan and the ECO countries 
Another important organization that emphasized Kazakstan's ethnic and religious 
features along with the Turkic Summits was its participation in the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO). The ECO, a development-oriented, economic 
remnant of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the military grouping of the pro-
Western Middle Eastern states324, was revived by its members, Turkey, Iran, and 
Pakistan, to encompass the newly independent Muslim states of the former USSR and 
Afghanistan. 325 The ECO encompasses a population of some 300 million people, 326 
which is greater than that of the CIS. Enlargement of the ECO occurred because of the 
need of member states for greater support from the international community. For 
example, the West alienation of Iran for its support of radical Islamism, Pakistan is need 
for support for its strife with India and its nuclear weapons programs. Turkey for its 
Kurdish and Cyprus problems, moreover, all motivated attempts to gain greater 
international support, former Soviet states and Afghanistan sought any kind of external 
partners. In economic aspects, close cooperation between these countries especially in 
the field of transportation, could facilitate economic development in the region. As 
Kemal Karpat has noted, "ECO membership opened the way for the new states to 
reincorporate themselves into the Islamic Middle Eastern world to which they belonged 
for millennia."327 But initially Kazakstan seemed cautious about emphasizing its Islamic 
identity because of Russia and Russians in Kazakstan. Therefore, Kazakstan 
participated the ECO session at Teheran in February 1992 only as an observer, while 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan had already expressed their will to join the 
324 Anthony Hyman, "Central Asia's Relations with Afghanistan and South Asia," in Ferdinand (ed.), pp. 
91-92. 
325 Anthony Hyman, "Power and Politics in Central Asia's New Republics," in Max Beloff (ed.), Beyond 
the Soviet Union: The Fragmentation of Power, Aldershot, 1997, p. 203. 
326 Anthony Hyman , "Central Asia and the Middle East: The Emerging Links," in Mesbahi (ed.), Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, pp. 254-255. 
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organization.328 Kazakstan formally joined the ECO in November 1992, alongside with 
Azerbaijan, the other Central Asian states, and Afghanistan.329 But again, the ECO 
could not form a functioning body mostly because of the blunt political and economic 
rivalry among the leading powers of the organization. Also, it has been said that, 
because of Iran, the organization could not actively function. Thus bilateral relations 
replaced the structure of cooperation, although the Investment Development Bank of the 
ECO-with a fund of some $400 million-funded several joint projects. 330 
A. Kazak-lranian relations 
Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) form one of the most important 
aspects of Kazakstan's foreign policy and, in fact, encompass some peculiarities and 
dilemmas, that cannot accounted for the two countries' official orientations. After the 
Islamic revolution of 1979, the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran declared 
Islam as the "sole foundation of the Iranian identity,"331 while Kazakstan always 
expressed its role as a bridge between Europe and Asia, Islam and Christianity, and 
portrayed radical Islam as a source of regional instability. Very interestingly, Kazakstan, 
which is itself severely dependent of Western financial aid, especially that of the USA, 
conducts a friendly policy towards Iran, while preventing the transfer of nuclear 
materials and technology to Iran, the spread of radical Islam, and the containment of 
Iran are among the US priorities in the region. 332 
Kazakstan has no land borders with any of the regional non-CIS Muslim states and 
only has a sea border with Iran-making Iran one of its key strategic neighbours. On 
327 Karpat, 'The Role of Turkey and Iran," p. 184. 
328 Olcott, CANS, p. 32; and Twining, p. 141. 
329 Hyman, "Power and Politics in Central ," p. 203. 
330 Hyman, "Central Asia's Relations," p. 93. 
331 Tchangiz Pahlevan, "Iran and Central Asia," in Touraj Atabaki and John O'Kane (eds.), p. 73 
332 Hunter, Central Asia Since, p. 158. 
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December 25, 1991,333 Iran recognized the independence of the Republic of Kazakstan 
and, on January 29, 1992, the two countries established diplomatic relations.334 Despite 
the dominance of the Shia Islam in Iran (while most of the Central Asian Muslims are 
Sunnites) the growth of Iranian involvement in Central Asia was expected to spur 
religious sentiment in the region. Indeed, by 1992 the number of mosques increased to 
5000 while in 1989 there were only 160. 335 But in fact, the statement of the Iranian 
Foreign Minister Velayeti saying, "Iran's improving relations with Central Asian 
countries does not mean that we force them to accept our standards. We advise them on 
the methods we prefer,"336 is more accurate reflection of reality. . Iran harshly suffered 
from a policy of alienation by the West, especially by the USA, which envisaged it as a 
source of regional, or even global instability, and posed an indirect economic embargo 
hampering its economic development. This American antagonism forced the country to 
conduct close relations with the newly independent Central Asian states which could be 
expected to ease its 'loneliness' and provide Iran with economic privileges and 
advantages, to an extent that would not severely damage the country's 'spiritual' 
structure. Under these circumstances, Kazakstan plays an important role in Iranian 
objectives in the region. It was reported that Iran was interested in acquiring nuclear 
weapons technology and enriched Uranium. 337 Therefore Kazakstan, then the only 
Muslim state with nuclear weapons including nuclear testing sites and research 
institutes, certainly attracted Iran. Second, Kazakstan was one of the Caspian Sea littoral 
countries that possessed huge oil and gas reserves. The new country was looking for a 
way to transport its natural wealth. Naturally, Iran laid possible routes, which provided 
333 Carol R. Saivetz, "Central Asia: Emerging Relations with the Arab States and Israel," in Malik (ed.) 
Central Asia, p. 314. 
334 Tokayev, p. 524. 
335 Twining, p. 141. 
336 New York Times, 22 March 1992; cited by Smolansky, p. 304. 
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Iran certain bargaining power: if the pipeline passes through the territory of Iran, this 
would bring economic and strategic gains. And finally, besides being an important 
market for Iranian goods, Kazakstan, with its sizeable industrial and agricultural 
potential, was regarded as an important regional partner. 
For Kazakstan, the Islamic Republic of Iran was an even more important partner. 
First and foremost, Iran offers the only reasonable opportunity for Kazakstan and for the 
rest of the Central Asia to transport their natural resources and goods to the open sea 
and world market via the territory of only one country, save Russia. Thus, Iran is one of 
the few countries that can seriously challenge Russia's 'exclusive' right to transport 
Kazak oil. Also, Iran is among the major littoral states of the Caspian Sea. Thereofore, 
the establishment of close and harmonious relations with Iran could somehow facilitate 
the solution of the Caspian Sea legal status dispute in Kazakstan's favour. It is usually 
said that Kazakstan avoids entrenched incorporation in the Turkic world because of the 
Russian discontent. However, another important objective of such a policy might be the 
Iran factor: the emphasis on the republic's Turkic identity could cause displeasure in 
Iran. Kazakstan also actively participated in regional forums, that excluded Turkey, 
such as the Caspian Sea Association organised by Iran in October 1992.338 
Another important aspect that makes the transportation of oil via Iran advantageous 
is the presence of close relations between Russia and Iran in both economic and political 
terms, while other states like Turkey or Pakistan do not have such cordial political 
relations with Russia. 
337 David Hoffman, Washington Post, 2 February 1992; and Peter Grrer, Christian Science Monitor, IO 
February 1992; both cited by Smolansky, p. 301. 
338 Twining, p. 143 
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Although the Kazak officials expressed the idea that Kazakstan certainly would not 
want to be an Iranian-type Islamic state,339 they obviously avoid blaming Iran for 
spurring Islamic extremism. On the contrary, Iran is presented among the republic's 
respectable partners. As President Nazarbayev has stated, Kazakstan "takes into 
consideration special attitude of the United Sates to Iran ... , at the same time this the 
shortest way to the Gulf and we shall not refuse from it. We are guided not by political 
motives but the economic interests."340 Although it still remains insufficient, the volume 
of Kazak-Iranian trade is in a state of rapid increase: from only$ 229,000 in 1992, it 
reached$ 58,9 million in 1995; Kazak exports amounted to$ 43,8 million and imports-
$15,1 million. 341 
B. Pakistan 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan (IRP), another member of the ECO, occupies an 
important place in Kazakstan's foreign policy priorities. Pakistan's developing 
economy, its geographic location, and population potential make the two countries 
active partners, despite the fact that Pakistan has no border with Kazakstan. Pakistan 
recognized the independence of Kazakstan on December 20, 1991, and the two 
countries established diplomatic relations beginning on February 24, 1992. 342 
Pakistan's aspirations to play an active role in the region have been shaped to a 
considerable extent by its acute rivalry with India: Pakistan hopes to gain the support of 
the new Muslim states and eliminate the former friendship bonds between India and the 
USSR. Reciprocally, India tries to prevent further expansion of Pakistani influence and 
339 "Tehran and Kazakhstan Sign Pacts," Turkish Daily News, 30 October 1993; cited by Mehmet Ogutirii, 
"Eurasian Energy Prospect: Need for a Long-Term Western Strategy," Eurasian Studies (Ankara), Vol. 1, 
No. 3 (Fall 1994 ), p. 77. 
340 "Nazarbayev's View on Kazak-Russian Relations Unchanged," Interfax, 17:33 GMT, 2 Feb 95; in 
FBIS-SOV-95-023. 
341 Tokayev, p. 532. 
342 Ibid., p. 257. 
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the establishment of a "Muslim economic bloc"343 under the ECO. The development of 
nuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India seems to facilitate the elimination of an 
actual war, but in fact, might make other means of struggle, such as economic and 
political rivalry, more active. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Soviet successor Muslim 
states brought some advantages to Pakistan making it an influential power in the region 
and the Muslim world. It is said that the decline of the Soviet system weakened the 
three main supporters of India and pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan against Pakistan: 
the KGB, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet military. 344 In 
addition to the two countries' strategic objectives, both India and Pakistan were 
seriously interested in economic involvement in Kazakstan and other Central Asian 
countries. Besides the export of goods, the two countries also intended to develop 
medium-scale manufacturing facilities in Kazakstan, especially in textile and food 
sectors. Growing Sino-Pakistani relations, especially in the military field, forces India to 
establish new of foreign relations, namely with Muslim countries such as Iran and 
Central Asian states. Kazak-Pakistani relations are still far from being satisfactory and 
the volume of trade between the two countries has amounted only to $12,2 million. 345 
However, the real number should be greater because of credits and loans provided by 
Pakistan and a number of projects that have not been implemented yet. However, 
strategic and economic links are not the only aspects of consideration. According to 
Anthony Hyman, many eminent Pakistani families claim their descent from Central 
Asia.346 
343 Hunter, p.140. 
344 Hafeez Malik, "New Relationship between Central and Southwest Asia and Pakistan's Regional 
Politics," in Malik (ed.), Central Asia, p. 252. 
345 Tokayev, pp. 262-263. 
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3. The Organization of Islamic Conference 
The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), established in February 1970, and 
comprising 54 countries, 347 is the most important diplomatic organization in the Muslim 
world. Beyond doubt, the OIC could provide considerable support for the new 
republic's independence, while the huge support of Muslim countries could certainly 
grant the country some bargaining power and to some extent counterbalance Russian 
dominance over Kazak:stan. Another aspect of the republic's attempts to was the 
financial assistance provided by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference. 
Kazak:stan, as other post-Soviet Muslim states, was invited to the Senegal Meeting 
of the OIC held in Dak:kar in December 1991. 348 The delegates of the Kazak Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs took part in the meeting only as observers. As Olcott has argued, both 
Kazak:stan and Kirghizstan delayed their entry to the OIC because they intended to 
avoid their states to be closely associated with Islam. 349 It has also been argued that 
Kazak:stan was interested "in economic cooperation with Muslim states but not 
politics.350 On December 12, 1995, Kazak:stan became a full-member of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Islamic Development Bank. 351 Besides 
providing financial support for several projects through the Islamic Development Bank, 
namely ecological and medical financing and infrastructure projects, the OIC forum can 
be considered as an important attempt to gain political support throughout Islamic 
world. Also the personal meeting of these countries' officials in a friendly atmosphere 
might help to avoid escalation of problems between neighbouring Muslim states. The 
346 Hyman, "Power and Politics," p. 209. 
347 Tokayev, p. 667, 669. 
348 Saivetz, "Central Asia: Emerging Relations ... ", p. 315. 
349 Olcott, CANS, p. 32. 
350 Hunter, p. 150. 
351 Tokayev, p. 672. 
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Kazak Foreign Minister Erlan Idrisov called OIC member countries to summon their 
efforts in a struggle against terrorism, organized crime and drug-dealing at the Kuala-
Lumpur Conference of the OIC foreign ministers on June 29-30, 2000.352 
4. Kazakstan and the Middle East 
A. The Arab World 
Kazakstan's independent state-building and commitment to a foreign policy free of 
the intrusion and obsessions of the Soviet Union required diversification of international 
linkages and elimination of certain prejudices. In this regard, the Middle East, or even 
the whole Muslim world, was divided between 'friends' and 'pro-American' states, 
during the Soviet period. Beyond doubt, Kazakstan identified itself as a Muslim state, 
but the complexity of its relations with Russia and other Soviet-successor states had 
prevented an emphasis on Islam. The entrenchment of Islamic identity and values could 
ferment the separatist activities of Kazakstani non-Muslims, mostly Russians. The new 
country presented itself as a "bridge between the Islamic East and the Christian 
West,"353 in order to avoid any tension, but also permitted the revival of Islamic identity 
and traditions at an informal level. In fact, it is not easy to assert, as some did, that 
Kazakstan's interest in Islam was simply for financial reasons. 354 Throughout its 
history, the Kazaks identified themselves with Islam. Indeed, clergy had always been 
highly respected in society. It could certainly be said that Islam was among the primary 
factors that solidified Kazak societal cohesion. More importantly, Russia and Russians, 
whether in Kazakstan or not, started to contemplate social, demographic and even 
political, differences between them and the Kazaks or other Central Asians-an 
important reason for the Russian exodus from Kazakstan. Posovalek, a prominent figure 
352 Panorama (Almaty), No. 27, (July 2000). 
353 Olcott, CANS, p. 32 
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in Russian foreign policy, has denoted the Islamic world as "a belt extending from 
Kazakstan to Mauritania," (emphasis added).355 
Kazak leadership commits to a flexible policy towards the Islamic world and 
craftily avoids casting any blame and suspicion on Islamic countries. President 
Nazarbayev himself shows up in mosques, albeit very rarely. His rhetoric about Islamic 
fundamentalism and radicalism is strictly directed against criminal activities, and he 
never refrained from praising the consolidating and peacekeeping features of Islam. 
Contrary to other Central Asian republics- Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan - Kazakstan is likely to be the only country to commit balanced relations 
with the Islamic world. Uzbekistan, for instance, cooled its relations even with Turkey, 
the most moderate and secular among Muslim states, blaming Turkey for supporting 
Uzbekistan's 'Islamic' opposition. During his visit to Qatar in 1998 President 
Nazarbayev said that "Astana is the northwest capital of an Islamic state in the world" 
(emphasis added). 356 A great number of mosques, medresses, and Islamic centers were 
established in the republic within a few years of independence along with cultural 
centers of some Muslim countries, such as Egypt and Qatar. Recently, a new Mufti of 
Kazakstan, Absattar Derbisaliyev, an orientalist and Arabist, was elected at the Third 
Qurultay of the Kazakstani Muslims replacing Ratbek-Haji N1sanbay-uh, who served as 
a Mufti since the Soviet period. 357 
While enjoying its peculiar status as the least 'endangered' by Islamic radicalism, 
Kazakstan seems to be the only Central Asian newly independent state not considering 
Islamic movements as major opposition to the leading elites and a threat to stability as 
354 Ibid., p. 31 
355 Al-Hayat (In Arabia), 17 September 1992; in FBIS-USR, 2 October 1992, p. 49; cited by Mesbahi, 
Russia and the Geopolitics, p. 280 
356 "Mechet' Velikogo Kipchaka," Trud v Tsentral'noy Azii, 15 June 2000; in IAC Eurasia, 
www.eurasia.org.ru. 
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Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and to some extent Kirghizstan. On the contrary, religious and 
nationalistic Kazak organizations, which have been mostly intertwined, in fact to 
contribute the state's independence and commit to policies ministering national 
interests, especially by activating public opinion against Russian aspirations over the 
republic. Upon the escalation of the Azeri-Armenian conflict in Karabag, Kojahmedov, 
a prominent leader of Kazakstani Islamic and nationalistic movement Azat, proposed to 
send a Kazak battalion to help Muslim Azeris. 358 
According to Zviagelskaia, political Islam is a social movement reflecting the 
process of acceleration of social marginalization between the rich and the poor. 359 Amin 
Saikal has asserted that political Islam has been on the increase mostly because Muslim 
republics suppressed by communism seek to rediscover their roots and identities. 360 
Therefore, autocratic suppression of Islamic movements would certainly make it more 
active and detrimental. As Graham Fuller has stated, since the collapse of communism 
"Islamic radicalism is the most 'global' radical movement in the world."361 
One of the most important reasons that made Middle Eastern Arab countries 
attractive for Kazakstan was their petroleum exporting economies that could be an 
important experience for the young republic in search for the opportunity to export its 
rich Caspian Sea oil. On the other hand, rich Middle Eastern countries, and especially 
Saudi Arabia, a country that hosts the holy places of Islam and regards itself as 
possessing a sacred task to help and protect Islamic values all over the world, were 
regarded as a source of financial aid. Financial aid from the Kingdom of the Saudi 
Arabia which has already allotted 15% of its oil income to other countries as financial 
358 Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad, p. 122. 
359 Zviagelshaie, p. 12. 
360 Saikal, "Russia and Central Asia," p. 153. 
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aid, raised great hope.362 Even prior to the collapse of the USSR, Saudi Arabia provided 
some $ 2,5 billion as direct aid or loans. 363 Kazakstan established broad economic and 
diplomatic relations with many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the 
United Arab Emirates, but still the lack of direct borders between Kazakstan and the 
Arab countries hampered the development of broad trade relations, especially for the 
export of Kazakstani agricultural goods to these states. Among the Arab countries, 
Oman played a unique role by actively participating in gigantic pipeline projects from 
Kazakstan, especially in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, where it cooperates with 
Kazakstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia. 364 In addition to its economic activities with the 
Arab states, Kazakstan attempts to generate an impression of a friendly state and, as a 
rule, has criticized the use of force against Iraq by the West. 365 
B. Kazakstan and Israel 
Another complex stage for the incipient Kazak foreign policy is its relations with 
Israel and Palestine, which naturally affects its relations with the Arab states and the 
whole Muslim world. It seemed that Kazakstan is aware of the great importance of 
establishing friendly relations with Israel, which is important for the republic's relations 
with the West, especially the USA, where the Jewish lobby is very influential. On the 
other hand, improvement of Kazak-lsraeli relations might simultaneously cause the 
exacerbation of relations with Arab states, which occupy an important place for the 
republic's economic and political life. Notably, Kazakstan followed a coordinated and 
balanced policy toward the region and the Kazak officials have been very prudent and 
cautious in their every statement. 
362 Tokayev, p. 563. 
363 Twining, p. 143. 
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Israel, with its advanced technology and financial opportunities, was an important 
economic partner for the Kazakstan's weakened economy. In January 1993, the 
Eisenberg Group of Israel expressed their will to participate in several projects in 
Kazakstan amounting to $ 2 billion including upgrading oil refineries, which showed 
Israel's interest in Kazakstan and its economic capacity.366 In addition to cooperation in 
the economic field, the two countries provided some other advantages to each other. 
First, establishment of good relations with Kazakstan provides an ally for Israel in the 
Muslim world, which-if not lobbying for its interests-might at least serve as a mediator 
in disputes with Muslim countries. During Nazarbayev's visit to Israel in December 
1995, the families of Israeli military pilots lost in Southern Lebanon and supposed to be 
seized by Iranian forces requested him to ask Iranian President Rafsanjani to release 
them. Surprisingly, Nazarbayev kept his word and talked with Rafsanjani on the matter 
in May 1996.367 Naturally, friendly Kazak-lsraeli relations prevent commitment of pro-
Islamic policy by Kazakstan in a way that could be harmful to Israel. 
The key point of Kazak-Israeli relations is likely to become the attitude towards the 
Palestinian state and the Middle East peace process. Dmitry Trofimov has stated that 
"Kazakhstan is clearly in a favourable position here because of its more balanced 
approach, allowing it to maintain mutually beneficial relations both with the Arabs and 
with Israel. In contrast, Uzbekistan has shifted the balance in favour of Israel, a move 
which is unacceptable for many Arab countries."368 Contrary to some Central Asian 
leaders, President Nazarbayev also paid an official visit to Palestine during his official 
visit to Israel in December 1995. 369 In an interview with an Israeli journalist, 
Nazarbayev stated that Kazakstan's "approach to the rival sides in the Middle East is 
366 Hugh Carnegie, Financial Times (London), 28 January 1993; cited by Hyman, "Central Asia and the 
Middle East," p. 262. 
367 Tokayev, pp. 540-541. 
368 Trofimov. 
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even-handed."370 But in fact, the Kazak support for the new Palestinian state has not 
only remained on paper, but has assumed an active form: on April 6, 1992, Kazakstan 
and the Palestinian state established diplomatic relations and Yasir Arafat, then the 
leader of the PLO twice visited Kazakstan - in 1991 and in 1993 - when he was 
received by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Kazakstan 
respectively. 371 During the last visit of Arafat, the latter stated that "towards the Middle 
East Kazakstan has unchanged position and supports the implementation of the UN 
Security Council resolutions No.242 and 338, which stipulates release of occupied 
Arab territories. "372 
369 Karpat, 'The Role of Turkey," p. 183. 
370 Yedi'ot Aharonot, 13 Apr 1992, p.18; in FBIS-SOV-072, 14 April 1992, p. 56; cited by Savietz, p.322. 
371 Tokayev, p. 585. 
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Conclusion 
The circumstances that encircle Kazakstan and the Kazak nation, hardly resemble 
those of any other state in the world. It has a large number of ethnic groups other than 
native Kazaks, namely Russians, Ukrainians, Germans and others and it is not easy to 
call them minorities. Throughout Soviet history, and especially during Stalin's rule, 
Kazakstan had become a reservoir for several 'problematic' peoples, such as the 
Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Azerbaijanis, Meshetian (Ah1ska) Turks, Koreans, and 
Greeks. It is reported that some 100 different ethnic groups live in the country and many 
of them express their displeasure about the policy of 'Kazakization'. 
In economic terms, Kazakstan still remains an energy exporting state that mostly 
relies on the export of Caspian Sea oil, which makes the republic severely vulnerable to 
Russian pressure. Indeed, the only existing pipeline system belongs to Russia and 
passes through its territory. This oil transportation issue forces the country to conduct a 
highly diverse foreign policy especially to the countries which could play an essential 
role in the building of alternative pipelines, namely China, Turkey, and Iran. Kazakstan 
has built cordial economic and political relations with another Muslim state of the 
former USSR-Azerbaijan, a country which faces similar problems and could be a 
permanent ally in further Caspian Sea negotiations. 
On the eve of the 21st century, especially after the recent presidential elections in 
Russia, Kazakstan has been blamed of discriminating against its Russian population and 
of conducting a policy of forced 'Kazakization'. Today, Kazakstan is highly dependent 
and vulnerable on Russia not only in economic and military terms, but also in terms of 
politics. The election of Vladimir Putin as the President of the Russian Federation and 
his neo-imperialist aspirations to establish a new type of Russian governance, warned 
the Kazak leadership to conduct a multidimensional foreign policy. After Putin came to 
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power, the criticism in Russian media towards the situation of Russians in Kazakstan 
intensified. In addition to demographic pressure, Russia possesses the only functioning 
pipeline from Kazakstan. Therefore, it enjoys an 'exclusive right' to control the Kazak 
economy as it wishes. A great share of the Kazak budget consists of the Caspian oil 
revenues and the oil sector of Kazakstan attracts foreign investment more than any other 
sector in the republic. The Russian threats to cut off its oil transits, which would lead 
the Kazak economy into a severe economic crisis, forces Kazakstan to conduct a pro-
Russian foreign policy. Any bitter economic crisis in the republic might cause social 
unrest, and especially among the republic's Russian population. 
This vulnerable position caused by the republic's large Russian population and 
Russia's possession of pipelines, appears as the critical determinants of Kazakstan's 
foreign policy. It needs to diversify its policy as rapidly as possible. Land-locked 
Kazakstan is not able to enjoy the right to choose its neighbours. In this regard, the 
establishment of close relations with its neighbours would make Kazakstan less 
vulnerable, or at least lessen the effects of Russia's pressure. Kazakstan emphasises its 
struggle against terrorism, radical Islam, and drug-smuggling, implying that Russia 
would face a greater wave of terrorism, drug-trafficking, and radical Islam if Kazakstan 
were 'unable' to counter them. 
From 1999 on, Kazakstan activated a process of repatriation of ethnic Kazaks from 
abroad, thus facilitating their naturalization by Kazak legal organs. During the official 
visit of the Chinese Vice-Chairman Hu Jintao to Kazakstan in late July 2000, the 
Chinese side promised to solve the problem of mass repatriation of ethnic Kazaks to 
Kazakstan. 373 
373 Kazakh News (E-mail based RURFE News Bulletin), August 2, 2000. 
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The Republic of Kazakstan seems to have become aware of the importance of 
establishing close relations with the Muslim world. Unlike other regional countries (i.e. 
Uzbekstan, Tajikistan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan) Kazakstan seeks to establish close 
regional relations, which could ease the republic's severe dependency on Russia by 
providing other vectors to lean on in case of Russia's pressure. 
The Republic of Turkey represents a unique opportunity for Kazakstan' s 
cooperation. Besides its developed economy and established democratic values, Turkey 
is a kin-state for the Kazaks that might link the Turkic republics of Central Asia. More 
importantly, Turkey could act as the gate for Kazakstan either to the West or to the 
Muslim world, from which Kazakstan had been excluded for several decades during the 
Soviet rule. Although, the participation of Turkey in Kazakstan's development is likely 
to be underestimated, Turkey has come a long way. More importantly, Turkish 
influence can be perceived either at personal and social level. Deliberately thrown into 
oblivion throughout Soviet rule, Turkey has already gained its place in the hearts of 
common Kazaks. 
On the eve of the 21st century, the Republic of Kazakstan became a country that 
finally found its place in the world community. Today Kazakstan tries to create a state 
with its own national interests to lessen the burden of its former ideology. 
Despite the recent discovery of large-scale corruption in Kazakstan, the republic 
attained quite impressive economic figures raising the country's prospects. By 1997, 
Kazakstan held the first place among the CIS countries in overall direct investment per 
capita. According the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development report, in 
1989-1996, the per capita investment in Kazakstan amounted to $165-five times more 
that in Russia. 374 According to the recent figures presented by the Statistics Agency of 
374 "Kazakhstan: Government Ranks 1st in CIS Direct Investment," lnteifax, 13:32 GMT, 14 May 1997; 
in FBIS-SOV-97-134. 
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the republic of Kazakstan, in comparison with the same period of 1999, the increase of 
industrial production reached 16.3 %; direct investment increased by 29 %; Kazak 
exports almost doubled (January-May) amounting to $3.5 billion and most importantly, 
the positive balance of trade was equal to ( +) $1. 708 billion. 375 
375 "Statagentstvo otmechayet rost ekonomicheskikh pokazateley strany v pervom polugodii," Panorama 
(Almaty), No. 30, July 2000. 
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